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ABSTRACT 
Since 1999, Air Force Intelligence officers have been trained, force managed, and 
assigned in accordance with a “generalist” approach to intelligence disciplines.  
Specialization is the exception, and intelligence officers are assigned to a variety of 
missions, disciplines, and commands in an attempt to “broaden” their experience and 
maximize exposure to various disciplines.  Because of this approach, specialization 
training after completion of the Air Force Intelligence Officer Course has become crucial 
to intelligence officer success at the unit level.  This research examines specialization 
training provided to intelligence officers assigned to Air Force Special Operations 
Command (AFSOC) flying squadrons.  Information gathered through surveys and 
interviews of AFSOC squadron leadership, weapons officers, and intelligence officers, 
coupled with a detailed analysis of AFSOC Intelligence Officer responsibilities and 
training,  was utilized to develop a web-based survey designed to measure intelligence 
officer performance at unit level AFSOC flying squadrons.  The survey results were 
analyzed to determine areas of strength and weakness, and recommendations for 
optimizing specialization training were created from the survey results.  
Recommendations include actions to enhance intelligence at the individual and team 
level in AFSOC flying squadrons, minor modifications to specialization training, and an 
alternative intelligence career path which allows increased specialization is discussed.     
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. SCOPE ..............................................................................................................2 
1. AFSOC Intelligence Officers ..............................................................2 
2. Flying Squadron Selection ..................................................................3 
B. THESIS .............................................................................................................4 
C. CONTEXT ........................................................................................................4 
1. Career Field Management ..................................................................5 
2. Intelligence Officer Training ..............................................................5 
3. Roles and Responsibilities ...................................................................7 
D. CURRENT INITIATIVES ..............................................................................8 
E. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................8 
F. SUMMARY ......................................................................................................9 
II. THE 14N CAREER FIELD ......................................................................................11 
A.  THE ROAD TO THE “MODERN 14N” .....................................................11 
B. FORCE MANAGEMENT APPROACHES ................................................12 
1. Specialization ......................................................................................12 
2. First Moves toward Greater Breadth ..............................................13 
3. 14N Career Field as Generalists .......................................................14 
C. METHODS OF MANAGING GENERALIZATION ................................15 
1. Core Competencies ............................................................................15 
2. Managing Careers by Core Competencies ......................................15 
D. GLASS CEILINGS ........................................................................................17 
E. EFFECTS OF GENERALIZING THE 14N FORCE ................................18 
F. NEW APPROACHES ...................................................................................19 
1. Professional Competencies ................................................................19 
2. New Approaches to Force Management ..........................................20 
3. ISR Functional Areas ........................................................................20 
4. Functional Competencies ..................................................................22 
G. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................22 
III. 14N TRAINING .........................................................................................................25 
A. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER COURSE ......................................................25 
1. Course Description.............................................................................25 
2. Syllabus ...............................................................................................26 
3. Analysis ...............................................................................................29 
B. INITIAL QUALIFICATION TRAINING (IQT) .......................................29 
1. Course Description.............................................................................30 
2. Syllabus ...............................................................................................30 
3. Analysis ...............................................................................................32 
C. MISSION QUALIFICATION TRAINING (MQT) ...................................33 
1. Course Description.............................................................................33 
2. Syllabus ...............................................................................................33 
 viii 
3. Analysis ...............................................................................................35 
D. CONTINUATION TRAINING (CT) ...........................................................36 
1. Course Description.............................................................................36 
2. Syllabus ...............................................................................................36 
3. Analysis ...............................................................................................37 
E. ADDITIONAL SPECIALIZATION TRAINING ......................................38 
F. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................39 
IV. SQUADRON LEVEL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES .................................41 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................41 
B. OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS ...............................................................42 
C. UNIT LEVEL INTELLIGENCE REPONSIBILITIES .............................42 
1. Overview .............................................................................................42 
2. Guidance .............................................................................................43 
3. Research, Analysis and Dissemination .............................................44 
4. Order of Battle Displays ....................................................................44 
5. Mission Planning ................................................................................45 
6. Briefing, Debriefing, and Reporting.................................................46 
7. Access to Intelligence and Requests for Information (RFI) ...........47 
8. Personnel Recovery Support .............................................................47 
D. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................48 
V. SURVEYS AND INTERVIEWS ..............................................................................49 
A. TRAINING RESEARCH ..............................................................................49 
B. SURVEYS .......................................................................................................50 
1. Knowledge and Skills .........................................................................50 
2. Tailored Intelligence ..........................................................................51 
3. Specialization Training Recommendations .....................................52 
4. Open-Ended Survey Questions .........................................................53 
VI. SURVEY RESULTS ..................................................................................................55 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................55 
B. ANALYSIS .....................................................................................................55 
1. Statistical Analysis .............................................................................55 
a. 14N Knowledge and Skills ......................................................55 
b. 14N Product Tailoring ............................................................60 
c. 14N Specialization Training Recommendations ...................62 
2. Correlation Analysis ..........................................................................63 
3. Regression Analysis ...........................................................................65 
C. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................66 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................69 
A. PRIORITIZING SPECIALIZATION TRAINING....................................70 
1. Recommendation................................................................................70 
2. Discussion............................................................................................70 
3. Conclusion:  Prioritizing Specialization Training ..........................70 




a. Intelligence Weapons Officers Coordinate and Share 
Specialization Training Products ...........................................71 
b. AF Special Operations School (AFSOS) Instructors 
Coordinate with AFSOC IFTU Instructors to Schedule 
AFSOC IFTU Training ..........................................................71 
c. 14Ns Leverage AFSOS Expertise for Specialized Products ..71 
2. Discussion............................................................................................71 
3. Conclusion ..........................................................................................72 
C. SPECIALIZATION TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS .....................72 
1. Recommendation................................................................................72 
a. Discussion................................................................................72 
b. Conclusion ...............................................................................73 
2. Recommendation................................................................................73 
a. Discussion................................................................................73 
b. Conclusion ...............................................................................74 
3. Recommendation................................................................................74 
a. Discussion................................................................................74 
b. Conclusion ...............................................................................74 
4. Recommendation................................................................................74 
a. Discussion................................................................................75 
b. Conclusion ...............................................................................75 
D. SPECIALIZATION CAREER PATH .........................................................75 
1. Recommendation................................................................................75 
2. Discussion............................................................................................76 
3. Conclusion ..........................................................................................77 
APPENDIX A:  14N SURVEY (LEADERSHIP VERSION) ............................................79 
APPENDIX B:  14N SURVEY (14N VERSION) ................................................................85 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................93 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................95 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Defining 14N Competencies and Experience ..................................................21 
Figure 2. 14N Survey (Leadership Version) Page 1 .......................................................79 
Figure 3. 14N Survey (Leadership Version) Page 2 .......................................................80 
Figure 4. 14N Survey (Leadership Version) Page 3 .......................................................81 
Figure 5. 14N Survey (Leadership Version) Page 4 .......................................................82 
Figure 6. 14N Survey (Leadership Version) Page 5 .......................................................83 
Figure 7. 14N Survey (Leadership Version) Page 6 .......................................................84 
Figure 8. 14N Survey (14N Version) Page 1 ..................................................................85 
Figure 9. 14N Survey (14N Version) Page 2 ..................................................................86 
Figure 10. 14N Survey (14N Version) Page 3 ..................................................................87 
Figure 11. 14N Survey (14N Version) Page 4 ..................................................................88 
Figure 12. 14N Survey (14N Version) Page 5 ..................................................................89 
Figure 13. 14N Survey (14N Version) Page 6 ..................................................................90 
Figure 14. Command Sponsor Letter ................................................................................91 
Figure 15. Interview Questions and Themes .....................................................................92 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Intelligence Officer Course Syllabus ...............................................................27 
Table 2. Proficiency Key Code ......................................................................................28 
Table 3. AFSOC IFTU Syllabus Blocks ........................................................................31 
Table 4. AFI 14-2 MQT Requirements ..........................................................................34 
Table 5. Ready Intelligence Program Requirements .....................................................37 
Table 6. External Intelligence Trainer (EIT) Event Matrix ...........................................38 
Table 7. External Intelligence Trainer Event Training Currencies. ...............................39 
Table 8. Survey Results—14N Knowledge and Performance .......................................56 
Table 9. Survey Results–14N Product Tailoring ...........................................................61 
Table 10. Survey Results–14N Training Recommendations ...........................................63 
Table 11. Correlation Analysis–Individual Variables Versus Dependent Variable ........64 
Table 12. Regression Analysis .........................................................................................66 
 
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAA  Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
AETC  Air Education and Training Command 
ACO  Airspace Control Order 
AF  Air Force 
AFI  Air Force Instruction 
AFB  Air Force Base 
AFSC  Air Force Specialty Code  
AFSOS Air Force Special Operations School 
AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command 
AFSOF Air Force Special Operations Forces 
AOC   Air and Space Operations Center 
AOR  Area of Responsibility 
ASR  Air Support Request 
ATO  Air Tasking Order 
AvFID  Aviation Foreign Internal Defense 
BMC  Basic Mission Capable 
BQ  Basic Qualification 
C & R  Collection & Reporting 
CMR  Combat Mission Ready 
CoCT  Code of Conduct Training 
CSAR  Combat Search and Rescue 
CT  Continuation Training 
DCGS  Distributed Common Ground System 
 xvi 
EIT  External Intelligence Training 
EPA  Evasion Plan of Action 
GEOINT Geo-spatial Intelligence 
HUMINT Human Resources Intelligence 
IIT  Internal Intelligence Training 
IFTU   Intelligence Formal Training Unit 
IMINT  Imagery Intelligence 
IMOM  Integrated Many on Many 
IPB  Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace 
IPOE  Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 
IR  Infrared 
ISOPREP Isolated Personnel Report 
ISR  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
IWO  Intelligence Weapons Officer 
IQT  Initial Qualification Training 
MAJCOM Major Command  
METT-T Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops, Time 
MDS  Mission Design Series 
MISREP Mission Report 
MQT  Mission Qualification Training 
NSAV  Non-Standard Aviation 
OB  Order of Battle 
OCOKA Observation and field of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key  
  terrain, avenues of approach 
PBA   Predictive Battlespace Awareness 
 xvii 
PR  Personnel Recovery and Production Request 
RAP  Ready Airman Program 
RIP  Ready Intelligence Program 
RFI  Request for Information 
RPA  Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
SAM  Surface to Air Missile 
SOPE  Special Operations Planning Exercise 
SOG  Special Operations Group 
SEI   Special Experience Identifier 
SERE  Survival Evasion Resistance Escape 
SIGINT Signals Intelligence 
SOCOM Special Operations Command 
SOF  Special Operations Forces 
SOSS  Special Operations Support Squadron  
SOW  Special Operations Wing 
SPINS  Special Instructions 
STSR  Special Tactics Support Request 
TTP  Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
USAF  United States Air Force 
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
VR  Visual Recognition 
 xviii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xix 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First, I would like to thank my wife for her support throughout this process.  
Without her devotion, this would not have been possible.  I would also like to thank my 
thesis advisors: Dr. Sepp, Col (retired) Greenshields, and Doowan Lee.  Their time, 
patience, insight, and dedication to this process have contributed greatly to this project.   
The following individuals also contributed their time and expertise to this 
endeavor and this thesis would not exist without their efforts:  Mr. Randy Burkett,   Dr. 
Erik Jansen, Jennifer Duncan, Captain Dave Morandi, Technical Sergeant Travis 
Sampson, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Geehreng, Captain Michael Small, Mr. Ned Calvert, 
Capt Mahoney, Captain Jessica Graves, Captain James Blick, Major Erwin Waibel, 
Captain Jon Baker, Captain Adam Young, Mr. Donald Severns, Jean Tittle, Major 
Christopher Mullins, Major Charles Freel, Major Andrew Ray, Rikki Panis, Susan 
Hawthorne, George Crawford, Major Michael Gates, Lieutenant Jamie McRandle, and 
Mrs Patti Silver and U.S. Special Operations Command for funding the research trip.   
And finally, to the Air Force Intelligence professionals working tirelessly at flying 
squadrons around the globe—may your logic be sound, your briefings to the point, and 
may your efforts contribute to a successful mission.       
 xx 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Believe an expert.  
—Virgil1 
 
In the years prior to 1993, United States Air Force intelligence officers 
specialized in one of eight disciplines, providing officers with a great deal of 
specialization and expertise, but at the cost of breadth.2  The officer corps’ excessive 
specialization led to very narrow views of intelligence and service capabilities, and 
eventually prompted changes in intelligence officer force management to resolve the 
perceived weakness.3  Starting in 1994, AF senior leadership created the Air Force 
Specialty Code (AFSC) 14N, and broke the career field into three sub-disciplines—
Alpha, Bravo and Charlie.  Due to a continued perception of “stove-piped” intelligence 
officer experience, the career field was further unified into a single AFSC—14N—just 
five years after the first moves away from specialization.4 
Since 1999, Air Force (AF) intelligence officers have been trained as intelligence 
generalists and, through the current approach to career field management, do not 
specialize in any one mission area for more than one or two assignments in a given 
career.  While this generalization provides officers with a wide view of AF operations 
and intelligence, it sacrifices the depth of knowledge and experience required for 
expertise.  Between the extremes of total specialization and total generalization, 
representative of the pre-1993 and post-1999 approaches, a balance must be struck which 
enables intelligence officers to gain and maintain some level of expertise, while not 
stagnating in a single mission, job, or assignment.  
                                                 
1 “Virgil quotes,” Accessed October 28, 2011, 
http://www.quotesandpoem.com/quotes/listquotes/author/virgil/0.  
2 Mark Schwalm, “Transforming the Force: Past, Present & Future,” Slide presentation, Washington, 
D.C., October 28, 2002, 5. 
3 Marygail Brauner, et., al, “Improving Development and Utilization of U.S. Air Force Intelligence 
Officers,” RAND, 2009. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR628.html, 1. 
4 Mark Schwalm, “Transforming the Force: Past, Present & Future,” Slide presentation, Washington, 
D.C., October 28, 2002, 5. 
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Air Force intelligence officers are situated in a highly diverse operating 
environment and are expected to perform across three domains—air, space, and 
cyberspace.5  Within these domains, 14Ns operate amongst the USAF’s twelve core 
functions—nuclear deterrence, air superiority, space superiority, cyberspace superiority, 
global precision attack, rapid global mobility, special operations, global integrated 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), command and control (C2), 
personnel recovery (PR), building partnerships, and agile combat support.6  The level of 
complexity required for effective intelligence operations should be answered with 
extensive specialization training to ensure the knowledge and analytical skill to thrive.  
Over the past decade, Air Force Intelligence has made some great strides regarding 
specialization training.  The implementation of the Weaponizing Intelligence Combat 
Capabilities-Training (WICC-T) concept, designed as “an initiative to establish minimum 
proficiency standards for all USAF intelligence positions and to provide policy and 
guidance on how to train and certify intelligence personnel to meet these standards,”7 has 
brought great changes to AF intelligence specialization training.  First implemented for 
F-16 fighter and KC-135 refueling squadron intelligence personnel, the WICC-T 
construct was established via AFI for AFSOC squadrons in 2009.  But is this training 
sufficient to prepare AFSOC 14Ns for their assignments? 
A. SCOPE 
1. AFSOC Intelligence Officers 
This research is focused on AF intelligence officers—14Ns—assigned to Air 
Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).  This choice for emphasis does not 
presume that intelligence officers assigned to this command need more specialization 
                                                 
5 U.S. Air Force, “Air Force Mission,” October 28, 2011, http://www.af.mil/main/welcome.asp. 
6 U.S. Department of the Air Force,  Presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee,  Fiscal 
Year 2010 Air Force Posture Statement, by Michael B. Donley and Norton A. Schwartz, Washington, DC:  
Senate Armed Services Committee, 2009. http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/May/Donley-
Schwartz%2005-21-09.pdf 
7 James O. Poss, “Intelligence Training Transforms." Spokesman 46, 8 (2006): 3. 
http://www.afisr.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-060927-043.pdf. 
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training than an officer assigned to a fighter or bomber squadron, for example.  
Specialization training is equally important for all intelligence officers to adequately 
prepare them for assignments to various missions.  This study focused on AFSOC in an 
attempt to gauge the current state of specialization training and to measure 14N 
effectiveness at the unit level for the AF’s special operations force.  Similar studies are 
encouraged for other domains and missions in an attempt to better understand and assess 
specialization training for various AF intelligence assignments. 
While intelligence is provided to AFSOC squadrons from both officer (AFSC 
14N) and enlisted personnel (AFSC 1N0), often while working as a team within the 
squadron, this study focused on 14Ns in order to provide the contextual detail required 
for the research.  Intelligence officer career paths are managed separately and differently 
as compared to the enlisted counterparts, and separation of the two AFSCs, for the 
purposes of this research, was necessary to adequately explain the 14N’s environment—
especially regarding the effects of career field management on 14N experience.   
2. Flying Squadron Selection 
Within AFSOC, 14Ns are assigned to a vast array of squadrons and missions at 
the flying wing, group and squadron level.  Assignments at the flying wing level and 
below, often referred to AF-wide as “unit-level intelligence,” run the gamut in terms of 
SOF missions for AFSOC.  Squadrons within the command cover missions in special 
tactics (combat control, pararescue, combat weather), ISR (remotely piloted aircraft and 
distributed ground station missions), strike (AC-130, MC-130W, MQ-1/9), aerial 
refueling (MC-130P), fixed-wing (MC-130H/P/W) and tilt-rotor (CV-22) airlift, and non-
standard aviation (PC-12, M-28, et. al.).8  This study focused on 14Ns assigned to 
manned (i.e., not remotely piloted) flying squadrons—AC-130H/U, MC-130E/P/W, CV-
22, and Non-Standard Aviation (NSAV).  While intelligence for special tactics and 
dedicated ISR missions (e.g., remotely piloted aircraft squadrons) are equally important 
 
                                                 
8 Air Force Special Operations Command, “AFSOC Units,” October 27, 2011, 
http://www.afsoc.af.mil/units/index.asp 
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and complex, the specialization training and Air Force Instruction (AFI)-directed 
responsibilities at the squadron level were sufficiently different to exclude them from the 
scope of this research.  
AFSOC intelligence officers operate within the special operations core function 
at the flying unit level, however, this does not mean that 14Ns operate exclusively within 
this particular core function.  AFSOC unit-level intelligence may also operate in direct 
support of other core functions such as rapid global mobility, global integrated ISR, and 
personnel recovery, for example, while accomplishing squadron level duties.   
B. THESIS 
AFSOC 14Ns operate in a complex environment that requires tailored 
specialization training to prepare them for assignments to operational flying squadrons.  
Does the specialization training currently executed adequately prepare 14Ns for these 
assignments?  Can specialization training be optimized to better prepare 14Ns for these 
assignments? 
C. CONTEXT 
The environment in which AFSOC unit-level 14Ns are situated consists of three 
major elements:  the career field; training; and roles and responsibilities at the squadron 
level. Today’s approach to career field management establishes the basic professional 
environment and includes the current approach for 14Ns as generalists, areas of current 
14N core expertise, professional competencies, tradecraft, and knowledge.  Training for 
14Ns assigned to AFSOC squadrons is broken into five phases:  the intelligence officer 
course; initial qualification training (IQT); mission qualification training (MQT); 
specialized training, and continuation training (CT).  Roles and responsibilities at the 
squadron level are directed by Air Force Instructions (AFI) and mandate specific tasks 
for unit-level 14Ns operating with AFSOC flying squadrons.  Each of these three major 
elements will be introduced briefly below, and then explored more fully in the second, 
third, and fourth chapters, respectively, that follow. 
 5 
1. Career Field Management 
Since the move from specialization in 1999, AF intelligence officers are generally 
not assigned within the same core function for more than an assignment or two.  For 
AFSOC 14Ns, this means that assignments as a Lieutenant or Captain to the flying unit 
level will be followed by a different assignment, for example to a signals intelligence 
(SIGINT) unit in another command (i.e., outside of AFSOC), in order to “broaden” 
officers.  While this approach does create generalists who have working knowledge of 
multiple core functions after several assignments, it sacrifices a tremendous amount of 
expertise each time an officer starts in an entirely new mission area.  “Corporate 
knowledge” regarding organizations, missions, professional contacts, and “lingo” is often 
no longer relevant upon reassignment and this knowledge must be regained at the new 
job.  In cases where the new assignment is significantly different (e.g., a move from 
AFSOC to Space Command), a limited of knowledge from the previous assignment will 
be useful at the new assignment.  Specialization training aims to ease this transition, but 
four week courses cannot replace knowledge gained over multiple years of experience.  Is 
there a balance that can be struck which allows some level of specialization without 
sacrificing a total reset of organizational, and mission knowledge with each new 
assignment? 
2. Intelligence Officer Training 
After selection to the intelligence career field, AF officers commence a training 
process which starts with the 315th Training Squadron “Intelligence Officer Course” at 
Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas.  This six-and-a-half month course provides students 
with a training baseline covering all aspects of Air Force Intelligence and all officers 
attend the same course.  Officers are awarded the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) 14N 
upon successful completion of the curriculum.  Once 14Ns receive assignments to 
various positions within the Air Force, specialization training is provided, if available, as 
officers start work in their new assignments.  Officers selected for assignment to AFSOC 
squadrons, with the exception of those assigned to remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and 
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distributed common ground station (DCGS) assignments that receive separate 
specialization training, will proceed to the next training phase—Initial Qualification 
Training (IQT). 
AFSOC 14N IQT requirements are directed by AFI 14-202 Intelligence Training 
and are fulfilled by the AFSOC Intelligence Formal Training Unit (IFTU) curriculum at 
Hurlburt Field, Florida.  Similar to the Intelligence Officer Course’s approach of training 
officers across all AF intelligence disciplines, the AFSOC IFTU trains 14Ns across all 
AFSOC missions and applicable intelligence disciplines,9 with the exception of officers 
bound for RPA and DCGS squadrons as described above.  AFI 14-202 mandates 
completion of the AFSOC IFTU prior to assignments in the Major Command’s 
(MAJCOM) squadrons and officers must attend and complete the 20 day course before 
moving to the third phase of training—Mission Qualification Training (MQT)—at their 
respective squadrons.10  
MQT is conducted at the AFSOC flying wing where the 14N will be assigned, 
and this training must be completed before 14Ns can proceed to their assigned flying 
squadrons.  This training is “needed to qualify intelligence personnel to perform their 
specific unit mission in an assigned position,”11 and the duration ranges from four to 
eight weeks, depending on the curriculum.  MQT is generally the responsibility of the 
Intelligence Weapons Officer (IWO) or similarly designated officer, and establishes a 
tailored training baseline for specified tasks, knowledge, and roles the 14N is expected to  
execute at the squadron.  14Ns will also establish initial currencies in all AFI 14-2 AF 
Special Operations Forces (AFSOF)/Personnel Recovery (PR) directed tasks during 
MQT. 
Before AFSOC 14Ns can brief and provide intelligence to aircrews, specialized 
training must be completed.  This training is completed at the flying wing in the weeks 
after MQT and includes various steps to certify 14Ns for operations at their assigned 
                                                 




squadrons.  Specialized training is the final training phase before starting work at their 
assigned squadrons and is followed by continuation training (CT) for maintaining 
currency.   
Continuation Training is designed to help intelligence officers maintain currencies 
and proficiency on the myriad of threat, mission design series (MDS), SOF, ISR, and 
evasion and recovery knowledge, plus job-related tasks required for effective operations.  
These knowledge and task proficiencies must be maintained for 14Ns to operate 
effectively at the unit level.  Conducted weekly while in garrison (i.e., not deployed), CT 
can be either knowledge or task related and ensures 14Ns maintain AFI-mandated 
currencies.   
3. Roles and Responsibilities 
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) intelligence officers assigned 
to manned flying units such as AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and “Non-Standard Aviation” 
(Light Airlift) squadrons serve as critical members of the squadron operations team and 
are essential to squadron-level operations effectiveness.  While specific, nuanced tasks 
within each squadron are slightly different based on the supported aircraft mission design 
series (MDS), intelligence officer roles and responsibilities at the unit-level include, in 
general, providing updates on current theater events, threat disposition and capabilities, 
mission planning operations, and evasion and recovery support. 12  Accurate, mission-
tailored intelligence contributes to mission accomplishment, whereas inaccurate and non-
mission-tailored intelligence could lead either to degraded mission accomplishment, or, 
in a worst-case scenario, damage or destruction of the platform, crew, and failure of the 
special operations mission in its entirety.  After briefly discussing intelligence training 
and the basic differences between in-garrison and deployed operations, this chapter will 
 
 
explain AFI intelligence requirements for flying units and explore, in detail, each of the 
                                                 
12Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, 
June 1, 2009, 14-17. 
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intelligence roles and responsibilities that enable AFSOC missions during employment 
and sustainment.   
D. CURRENT INITIATIVES 
Formal feedback on AF intelligence officers is requested and collected by the 
315th Training Squadron (Intelligence Officer Course) approximately six months after 
14Ns complete the AFSC-awarding course.  Surveys are sent to the officer’s supervisor 
and this feedback on 14N performance, knowledge level and skills is utilized to evaluate 
the adequacy of the training syllabus.  Feedback trends are collected and used during the 
annual 14N Utilization and Training Conference to modify 14N training.   
The feedback process in the months after 14Ns complete the AFSOC IFTU  is 
accomplished in three ways.13  First, students fill out critique forms on each lesson, the 
lesson material and the instructor after each course.  Next, a formal feedback form is sent 
to the unit training manager in the months after students complete the AFSOC IFTU.  
Lastly, AFSOC IFTU trainers conduct field interviews on an annual basis.  While this 
feedback process produces useful information regarding the initial phase of AFSOC 
specialization training (IQT), there is no large-scale, comprehensive process to collect 
feedback on AFSOC 14N performance after all phases of specialization training are 
completed.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
This research was designed to shed light on an important issue—AFSOC 14N 
performance at AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NSAV flying squadrons—and aimed to 
answer a important question:  Does the specialization training provided to AFSOC 14Ns 
sufficiently prepare officers for their duties at the unit level?  To answer this question, a 
two-pronged approach was utilized.  First, extensive research and interviews were 
conducted on training provided to AFSOC 14Ns to baseline current syllabi, curriculums, 
and methods, with an emphasis on specialization training.  Second, an anonymous web-
                                                 
13 Donald Severns, e-mail message, November 10, 2011.   
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based survey was developed and executed to gauge 14N performance at the unit level.  
The survey was e-mailed to squadron leadership (commanders, operations officers, and 
weapons officers) as well as 14Ns serving at operational AFSOC flying squadrons.  This 
methodology will be fully explained in Chapter V. 
F. SUMMARY 
In the years prior to 1993, AF intelligence officers specialized in one of eight 
disciplines, providing officers with a great deal of specialization and expertise, but at the 
cost of breadth.  Since 1999, AF intelligence officers have been trained as intelligence 
generalists and, through the current approach to career field management, do not 
specialize in any one mission.  While this generalization provides officers with a wide 
view of Air Force (AF) operations and intelligence, it sacrifices the depth of knowledge 
and experience required for expertise.  Air Force intelligence officers are situated in 
highly diverse operating environments and are expected to perform across three domains 
and twelve core functions.  The level of complexity required for effective intelligence 
operations should be answered with extensive specialization training to ensure the 
knowledge and analytical skill to thrive.   
Great advances regarding specialization training have been made over the past 
decade, yet little feedback targeted at AFSOC 14Ns unit-level performance has been 
accomplished.  This research is focused on AF intelligence officers assigned to AFSOC 
and sought to shed light on 14N performance at AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NSAV 
flying squadrons.  The primary research question—does the specialization training 
provided to AFSOC 14Ns sufficiently prepare officers for their duties at the unit level—
was tackled via a web-based survey of squadron leadership and 14Ns to gauge 
intelligence officer performance at the unit level. 
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II. THE 14N CAREER FIELD  
Intelligence officers could spend more time in each job, 
thus acquiring greater depth in fewer areas. 
—RAND Corp, 200914 
 
The management of Air Force intelligence is fraught with many challenges, not 
the least of which is the fact the service operates in three domains—air, space, and 
cyberspace.15  With its seventeen operational functions,16 the Air Force demands an 
incredible breadth of knowledge and skill to enable this expanse of functions effectively 
at the operational and tactical levels.  The Air Force’s current approach of one Air Force 
Specialty Code (AFSC)—14N—for all intelligence officers is a drastic departure from its 
roots where eight sub-AFSCs existed.17  This single-AFSC policy reflects the service’s 
approach to develop “broadened specialists”18 in intelligence, but at what point does 
generalization become a liability due to a lack of expertise?  At the other end of the 
spectrum, specialization enables the building of expertise, but when does specialization 
(i.e., “stovepiping”) become counterproductive?  Certainly, a balance between 
generalization and specialization must be determined and implemented.  
A.  THE ROAD TO THE “MODERN 14N” 
This chapter seeks to explain historical as well as current Air Force approaches to 
the management of the intelligence career field, and analyzes the implications and 
progression of these approaches.  Because of the AF’s current approach to intelligence—
                                                 
14 Marygail Brauner, et al.,  “Improving Development and Utilization of U.S. Air Force Intelligence 
Officers,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR628, xii 
15 U.S. Air Force, “Air Force Mission,” October 28, 2011, http://www.af.mil/main/welcome.asp. 
16 U.S. Air Force,  “Basic Doctrine,” Air Force Doctrine Document 1,  2003, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd1.pdf 
17 Marygail Brauner., et al., “Improving Development and Utilization of U.S. Air Force Intelligence 
Officers,” RAND, 2009. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR628.html, 1. 
18 Ibid. 
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one AFSC and a “generalized” officer corps—AFSOC 14Ns (or any 14N for that matter) 
will rarely be allowed to specialize in any given mission area or within any intelligence 
discipline for more than one or two assignments.  As a result, a tremendous amount of job 
knowledge, especially as it pertains to organizations, “lingo,” and the supported weapons 
system capabilities, must be re-learned at each new assignment.  This chapter is intended 
to shed light on this “generalization-specialization paradox.”   
After providing a brief history of the progression of the intelligence AFSC from 
highly specialized through broadly generalized, the Air Force Intelligence core 
competencies—created to help guide the generalist career field—will be explored.  Next, 
the AF intelligence force management plan, which was utilized from 2002–2008, will be 
covered and analysis of the effects of the generalization approach will be highlighted.  
Finally, the current approach to career field management, first introduced in Deputy 
Chief of Staff of ISR (AF/A2) Lieutenant General David Deptula’s 2009 policy letter and 
later expanded upon by the current AF/A2, will be detailed.  Ultimately, this chapter will 
conclude that while the AF moved from a highly specialized force to a broadly 
generalized force over the course of fifteen years, this move did not come without costs 
to expertise.  The newest approach introduced in 2009, which takes a small step back 
towards specialization, is a move in the right direction towards building expertise back 
into the force, however, the pendulum must continue to swing toward specialization in 
order to strike the right balance on the spectrum.  Until this happens, extensive 
specialization training will be essential to building effective 14Ns.    
B. FORCE MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 
1. Specialization 
Prior to 1993, AF intelligence officers were divided into eight sub-AFSCs, 
essentially one field aligned with each intelligence discipline or “INT.”  Officers were 
trained and thus specialized in either human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence 
(SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G), 
 13 
applications (e.g., unit level intelligence), targeting, staff, or command.19  While this 
specialized approach to the management of officers in the intelligence career field yielded 
plenty of expertise, it was seen as unsustainable and excessively “stovepiped” officers 
purportedly knew too little about other INTs—a widely recognized and commonly 
discussed observation highlighted during Operation Desert Storm.  While this scenario is 
highly likely due to the specialization of intelligence officers at the time, was it 
necessarily an indicator of overall AF intelligence ineffectiveness? 
2. First Moves toward Greater Breadth 
With the post-Cold War downsizing of the force and with promotions lagging, AF 
leadership decided to create one AFSC—14N—with three sub-areas A, B, and C aligned 
with operations, applications, and mapping, charting and geodesy, respectively.20  The 
first year of the new 14N AFSC implementation was 1994.21  The three-shred 14N 
approach (i.e., 14NA, 14NB, 14NC) lasted from 1994–1998 and enabled officers to 
specialize within either the operations, applications, or mapping, charting and geodesy 
fields.  Example assignments in the operations, or “alpha” track, included jobs within 
multiple intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fields such as SIGINT, 
IMINT, and airborne ISR operations (e.g., RC-135).22  While the alpha track was 
“specialized” in terms of narrowing the field to include “only” ISR operations, this career 
track still required a vast amount of knowledge and skill to conquer jobs and tasks 
effectively.  One can easily argue that either the SIGINT or IMINT specialties can take 
the better part of a career to truly master.   
 
 
                                                 
19 Mark Schwalm, “Transforming the Force: Past, Present & Future,” Slide presentation, Washington, 
D.C., October 28, 2002, 5. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Marygail Brauner, et al.,  “Improving Development and Utilization of U.S. Air Force Intelligence 




Assignments in the applications, or “bravo” track included unit level intelligence 
assignments (e.g., flying squadrons, operations support squadrons) as well as targeting 
positions.  The mapping, charting and geodesy, or “charlie” track generally included 
assignments within the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), later renamed the National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency and, finally, taking on its current name, the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).  While these changes to the career field did bring 
a broadened approach to AF intelligence as compared to the eight sub-AFSC policy, AF 
leadership was still not happy with the career field and more changes were implemented.  
Due to a perception that the 3-shred approach was still “too specialized” for AF 
intelligence officers and a belief that “officers are not specialists—(the) enlisted force are 
our experts,” the 14N career field was modified again, this time to a single AFSC.23  
3. 14N Career Field as Generalists 
The new policy to “develop broadened specialists”24 by merging the 14N force in 
to a single AFSC began in 1999.25 One of the primary casualties of the new 
generalization approach was the extreme cutback in the amount of specialization training 
new 14Ns received on any given subject.  Using SIGINT training as a representative 
example provides a telling data point.  An intelligence officer attending initial training 
under the pre-1993 construct within the 8031 AFSC (SIGINT) received between four and 
five months of SIGINT training before going to his/her first assignment.26  In the 1994-
1998 three-shred approach, a 14N “Alpha” student received five weeks of SIGINT 
training.27  By 2002, a 14N in the single-AFSC approach received only five days of 
                                                 
23 Mark Schwalm, “Transforming the Force: Past, Present & Future,” Slide presentation, Washington, 
D.C., October 28, 2002, 5. 
24 Marygail Brauner, et al.,  “Improving Development and Utilization of U.S. Air Force Intelligence 
Officers,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR628, 1. 
25 Mark Schwalm, “Transforming the Force: Past, Present & Future,” Slide presentation, Washington, 
D.C., October 28, 2002, 5. 
26 Ibid., 6. 
27 Ibid., 6. 
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SIGINT training.28  While specialization training in the form of “top off intelligence  
courses,” later called intelligence formal training units (IFTUs) would eventually fill this 
training gap, some of these courses would not be developed for many years leaving the 
pressure on intelligence officers to “adapt and learn quickly”29 regarding skills and 
knowledge required on the job. 
C. METHODS OF MANAGING GENERALIZATION 
1. Core Competencies 
In a move to deal with the challenges of career field generalization, AF 
intelligence leadership developed core competencies, which were described as “vital 
areas of expertise.” 30 The five original 14N core competencies were intelligence 
preparation of the battlespace/predictive battlespace awareness (IPB/PBA), targeting, ISR 
campaign planning and execution, Air Operations Center (AOC)/unit operations, and 
force protection.31  These core competencies were later modified slightly and trimmed by 
one competency—force protection—to become four core competencies.  They were 
predictive analysis, ISR operations, targeting, and AOC/unit-level intelligence.  
Experience in each of these competencies was eventually tracked through “special 
experience identifiers” (SEIs).  Updates were called for on an annual basis to ensure 
personnel information was current.  These core competencies became the basis for the 
career field’s “4-3-2-1” force management plan from 2002–2008.32 
2. Managing Careers by Core Competencies 
The “4-3-2-1” plan was developed as a career guide for AF intelligence officers 
regarding the four core competencies and lasted for approximately seven years.  The plan 
                                                 
28 Mark Schwalm, “Transforming the Force: Past, Present & Future,” Slide presentation, Washington, 
D.C., October 28, 2002,  6. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Mark Schwalm, “Reviewing AF Intelligence Core Competencies,” Slide presentation, Washington, 
D.C., July 9, 2003,  5. 
31 Ibid., 6. 
32 Charles Freel, “14N Force Development,” Slide presentation, Washington D.C., 2011, 18. 
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called for 14Ns to acquire education in all four areas (via the AFSC-awarding course), 
exposure in three areas, special experience identifiers in two areas, and expertise/depth in 
one area.33  While easy to understand, this plan was ultimately abandoned starting in 
2009 because it “lacked key components of a force management strategy.”34  
Additionally, the plan was critiqued for having “started with what 14Ns need to do, not 
what we need to know,” as well as the fact that there was little to no deliberate 14N 
education throughout careers. 35   Other glaring faults included the elimination of AF 
Intelligence’s HUMINT capability starting in 1995—a capability which was re-started in 
May 2007.36   
Based on the documentation available, it is apparent that the motivations for the 
change to a single AFSC were at least twofold.  First, a single-AFSC approach provided 
officers with a more complete understanding of all of Air Force intelligence’s capabilities 
and contributed to the breaking down of the “stovepipes,” which existed under the pre-
1993 policy.  Second, and somewhat interconnected, the new approach was seen to 
increase the chances for 14N promotion to the general officer ranks.  This was a recurring 
theme regarding promotions and the perception that they were either “lagging” or “a 
concern.”37 Lagging promotions were highlighted during both the pre-1993 as well as the 
1994–1998 approaches to management of the career field,38 and this perception was not 
unfounded.  A third motivation worth mentioning is the fact that personnel management 
of the 14N career field (e.g., the “faces in spaces” aspect) was much more efficient with 
an aligned 14N career field.  
                                                 
33 Charles Freel, “14N Force Development,” Slide presentation, Washington D.C., 2011, 18. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA), “Why did the Air 
Force ISR Agency Stand Up a New Human Intelligence Detachment?” September 21, 2011, 
http://www.af.mil/main/welcome.asp. 
37 Mark Schwalm, “Transforming the Force: Past, Present & Future,” Slide presentation, Washington, 
D.C., October 28, 2002,  5. 
38 Ibid. 
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D. GLASS CEILINGS 
Getting AF Intelligence officers promoted to the rank of general officer has been 
a challenge for the intelligence career field since the early 1990s high of 14 general 
officers from intelligence backgrounds.39  By 2003, the “three top intelligence posts in 
the Air Force—each a general officer’s billet—(were) held by rated officers, not career 
intelligence officers.”40  From 2001 to 2005, only one career intelligence officer was 
selected for promotion to brigadier general.41  Fortunately, this situation has changed, 
and as of 2011 promotion rates for 14Ns to the general officer ranks are far better than in 
previous years.42  Additionally, there are currently several AF intelligence general 
officers serving in top intelligence jobs including the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AF/AA2) as well as two commanders of 
Joint Intelligence functions (J2) at combatant commands.43  As for the cause of this 
improved situation, it remains difficult to attribute definitively.  While 14N promotion to 
the general officer ranks is not the point of this research, a related question certainly 
pertains—does the entire 14N force have to generalize in a bid to become the next 
AF/A2?  Or it is more important to allow a portion of the force to specialize—in this case 
AFSOC 14Ns—for a part of their careers to allow the building of expertise and 
credibility?  This would help to ensure the expertise required of AF intelligence officers 
was acquired, utilized effectively, and not squandered as soon as the career field called 
for them to move to a new field each assignment under the guise of “broadening.”   
                                                 
39 Glenn W. Goodman Jr., “A Stacked Deck:   Intel Officers Find it Tough to Advance Beyond  




41 Glenn W. Goodman Jr., “A Stacked Deck:   Intel Officers Find it Tough to Advance Beyond  
Colonel,” Air Force Times, August 22, 2005,  http://www.airforcetimes.com/legacy/new/0-
AIRPAPER- 
1004864.php. 
42 James O. Poss, “State of the Intel Officer Career Field,” 14N webinar, Washington D.C., September 
12, 2011.  
43 Ibid. 
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E. EFFECTS OF GENERALIZING THE 14N FORCE 
The limited numbers of 14Ns in the general officer ranks reported in 2005 spurred 
further study into this area and resulted in a 2009 RAND Project Air Force report on the 
intelligence career field.44  Upon the USAF’s request, RAND “undertook an analysis of 
the competencies required for intelligence jobs and compared the qualifications in the 
officer supply with the qualifications jobs demand.”  According to the report, the study 
was at least in part inspired by: 
A mismatch in the late 1990s between the qualifications needed for key 
general officer positions and the available candidates’ background and 
experience stimulated an extensive force development initiative at the U.S. 
Air Force intended to improve the development of senior and mid-career 
officers.  The Air Force needed to shape cohorts of officers with sufficient 
breadth for their current jobs and for positions they may need to fill in the 
future. In the past, most officers had been managed almost solely within 
their career fields and were too narrowly specialized.45    
AF leadership’s interpretation of this mismatch for the intelligence career field 
had initially resulted in generalization (i.e., less specialization) of the intelligence officer 
corps in the mid-1990s, eventually resulting in the “one intelligence AFSC” approach.  
As for the effects of this approach on the 14N officer corps, the move to generalization 
may have gone too far. 
The effects of the single AFSC approach on the intelligence career field  were 
studied by RAND and captured a 2009 report entitled “Improving Development and 
Utilization of U.S. Air Force Intelligence Officers.”  Methodologically, the study first 
defined required background and experience for 14N jobs (i.e., the demand) through 
subject matter experts in the form of AF intelligence colonels.46  Next, AF intelligence 
officer qualifications (i.e., the supply) were determined based on historical personnel 
                                                 
44 Marygail Brauner, et al.,  “Improving Development and Utilization of U.S. Air Force Intelligence 
Officers,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR628. 
45 Ibid., 1. 
46 Marygail Brauner, et al.,  “Improving Development and Utilization of U.S. Air Force Intelligence 
Officers,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR628, xi. 
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records at the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC).47  Finally, the gaps between the 
supply and demand were assessed and the results indicated that it was possible to be “too 
broadened.”48  In fact, the study found that it had already occurred for 14Ns by 2009: 
Our study found that the types of experience needed for 14N jobs are far 
fewer than the types of experience accumulated. For example, there are on 
average only 10.8 job  requirements for 14N colonels, but over their 
careers 14N colonels acquire an average of 35 types of experience.  This 
number suggests that much greater depth is possible: Intelligence officers 
could spend more time in each job, thus acquiring greater depth in fewer 
areas.49 
F. NEW APPROACHES 
In March 2009, the 14N career field began the abandonment of the four core 
competencies as directed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR (AF/A2) in a policy letter.  
In place of the old competencies, Lieutenant General Deptula detailed the new guidance 
to the career field in two levels.  First was “core expertise … that body of knowledge we 
expect of all 14Ns to learn and to know better than any other career field in the AF.”50  
Intended to form the basis of education and training, core expertise was defined in three 
broad categories: analytic expertise; global ISR operations; and effects-based ISR 
planning and assessment.51   
1. Professional Competencies 
Next, seven professional competencies were detailed and they were described as 
“those intelligence mission areas in which we leverage our core expertise as full mission 
partners in air, space and cyber operations.”52  The professional competencies were:  
                                                 
47 Ibid., xii. 
48 Ibid., xiii. 
49 Ibid., xii. 
50 Lt Gen David A. Deptula, “Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
14N Policy Letter,” March 20, 2009. 
51 Ibid. 
52 David A. Deptula, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 14N 
Policy Letter, March 20, 2009. 
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Analysis and forecasting; foreign area expertise; ISR campaign planning; execution and 
assessment; kinetic and non-kinetic targeting; AOC capabilities and operations and; 
programming and acquisition.53  The AF’s top intelligence general (a rated officer) 
recognized that the list was not exhaustive and that the career field was too broad to “bin 
it neatly,” however, in just seven years’ time, the competencies jumped from four to 
seven and were far more inclusive and representative of AF intelligence tasks and 
knowledge requirements.54  Probably most importantly, Lt Gen Deptula recognized the 
challenges of intelligence across three domains and stated that “unlike the comprehensive 
nature of our core expertise, our professional competencies do not comprise a checklist 
for a single officer to experience.  Rather, intelligence force managers must ensure that as 
a career field [emphasis in original], we maintain sufficient expertise in each of these 
competencies.”55 
2. New Approaches to Force Management 
The 2009 policy letter continues to be developed, and the 14N Force Management 
2011 Plan details far more than what was covered in the Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR’s 
policy letter.  As compared to the 2002–2008 approach, the new policy being proposed is 
more comprehensive and includes experience tracking via AFPC, the establishment of 
14N skill levels, the introduction of 14N functional competencies, continuing technical 
training, and the addition of “open” and “expert” career paths as well as the development 
of a portion of the 14N force as regional specialists.56 
3. ISR Functional Areas 
In further defining the roles of 14Ns, the 2011 plan sets forth ISR functional areas 
in three categories.57  The first category is the intelligence cycle and enterprise 




56 Charles Freel, “14N Force Development,” Slide presentation, Washington D.C., 2011. 
57 Ibid., 6-9. 
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management.58  The second category are the new 14N functional competencies in two 
sub-categories—tradecraft and knowledge.59  And the third category are the levels of 
leadership—progressing from the company grade officer ranks through the field grade 
officer ranks at increasing spheres of influence and levels of responsibility.60  Putting it 
all together, 14N competencies and experience can be defined as “performing (the 
intelligence cycle), using tradecraft and knowledge, at the (designated) level of 
leadership, supporting the (assigned) mission area.”61  (See Figure 1) 
 
Figure 1.   Defining 14N Competencies and Experience62 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 6. 
59 Ibid., 7. 
60 Ibid., 8. 
61 Ibid., 9. 
62 Charles Freel, “14N Force Development,” Slide presentation, Washington D.C., 2011. 
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4. Functional Competencies 
The new 14N Force Management Plan’s functional competencies are eightfold 
and include analysis, collection management, operations-intelligence integration, near-
real-time ISR operations, cyber ISR operations, targeting; HUMINT, and airborne ISR 
operations.63  The knowledge competencies are six-fold and include geospatial 
intelligence (GEOINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), SIGINT, open-source 
intelligence (OSINT), measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), and Staff.64   
The strengths in the new plan lie in its robustness—issues as complicated as warfare and 
intelligence cannot be easily encapsulated in just four core competencies.  This is a 
double-edged sword, however, and the plan’s primary weaknesses lie in its complicated 
nature.  Management of expectations will be the crux of the new plan’s success or failure 
and a glimpse of the new 14N Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP)—a 
regulation that will mandate aspects of career field management—indicate that a shift 
back toward specialization is recommended for AF 14Ns.  In the draft document set to 
release in November 2011, the guidance states that 14Ns are expected to “truly master, at 
most, one competency in their career.”65 This new CFETP could significantly change the 
way 14Ns conduct business in the future, especially in allowing a greater degree of 
specialization as compared to the last decade. 
G. SUMMARY  
The breadth of operational and tactical level missions in which Air Force 
intelligence must operate is challenged by three domains and seventeen operational 
functions.  As a result, the AF demands an incredible breadth of knowledge and skill to 
enable this expanse of functions effectively.  The Air Force’s current approach of one Air 
Force Specialty Code (AFSC)—14N—for all intelligence officers is a drastic departure 
 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 7. 
64 Ibid., 7. 
65 Department of the Air Force, AFSC 14NX Intelligence Officer Career Field Education and Training 
Program (DRAFT), November 2011.   
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from its roots where eight former AFSCs allowed a considerable degree of specialization.  
The trend toward generalization started in 1994 and culminated in a single AF 
intelligence AFSC, but at what cost?   
This chapter explained the historical and current Air Force approach to the 
management of the intelligence career field, while analyzing the implications and 
progression of these approaches.  A history of the original five core competencies and 
their eventual transition into the four core competencies which dominated the 2002–2008 
timeframe were explored, in addition to the 4-3-2-1 policy which guided the 
generalization of the force.  The effects of this plan—namely the overgeneralization of 
14Ns as documented in the RAND Project Air Force report—demonstrates the cost of not 
allowing intelligence officers to specialize, at least to a certain extent.  Finally, the 
current approach to career field management, first introduced in 2009 explained that a 
more complex and robust career field management plan was necessary to effectively 
manage the 14N force.  Ultimately, while the new AF plan is a step in the right direction 
towards the much-needed specialization the 14N force lacked over the past decade, AF 
leadership must continue to evaluate and modify this approach to ensure the correct 
balance is found on the spectrum. 
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III. 14N TRAINING 
In times of crisis, people don’t rise to the occasion; they 
sink to their level of training.  
—Training Axiom 
Upon selection to the intelligence career field, AF officers begin a training 
process that can consists of up to five phases and lasts approximately nine months, 
depending on the assignment.  The phases—the AFSC-awarding Intelligence Officer 
Course, initial qualification training (IQT), mission qualification training (MQT), 
specialized training, and continuation training (CT)—progress from generalized through 
highly specialized training.  While some 14Ns will go straight to operational assignments 
after just the first phase of training, 14Ns with assignments to operational flying wings 
will complete the first four phases prior to an assignment to an operational squadron.  
AFSOC intelligence officers fall into this latter category, and must complete all training 
through “external intelligence trainer”—a certification required to instruct aircrews—and 
achieve “combat mission ready” status before serving at an AFSOC flying squadron.  
This chapter will detail the training AFSOC 14Ns receive, and will explore the five 
training phases to build the baseline required for later analysis.  
A. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER COURSE 
The initial training phase for AF intelligence officers is the “Intelligence Officer 
Course” at the 315th Training Squadron (315 TRS), Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas.  
This 141 training day, six-and-a-half month curriculum provides students with a training 
baseline covering all aspects of Air Force Intelligence and all officers, regardless of 
follow-on assignment, attend the same course.  Officers are awarded the Air Force 
Specialty Code (AFSC) 14N upon successful completion of the curriculum.   
1. Course Description 
The Intelligence Officer Course trains officers across all AF intelligence 
requirements and is designed to “provide a core curriculum of basic intelligence 
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fundamentals.”66 The course includes an introduction to intelligence and training on the 
intelligence cycle, signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), human 
intelligence (HUMINT), national intelligence support, intelligence support to 
warfighting, collection management, communication skills, targeting, intelligence 
support to operational units, attack assessment, adversary threats and tactics, friendly 
force capabilities and limitations, application, analysis, production, and dissemination of 
intelligence, and a capstone exercise.67 Class size is generally between 18 and 20 
students, and the curriculum includes instruction, progress checks in the form of briefings 
and other practicals, and written examinations to measure progress.68  Students struggling 
with concepts can be “washed back” to the beginning of a block to ensure required 
knowledge and skills are achieved and this process is exercised on a regular basis, 
occurring at a rate of approximately 28-29 percent.69  Students can be eliminated from 
the course, however, this only occurs at a rate of about one percent.70 
2. Syllabus 
The 14N course is broken into 21 blocks of instruction and serves to introduce 
and familiarize students with a vast amount of knowledge and skills on the intelligence 
community, missions, tasks, and responsibilities.  A summary of the instructional blocks 





                                                 
66 Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Course Syllabus, Intelligence Officer Course, June 
15, 2007. 
67 Ibid. 
68 David Morandi, interview by author, Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX, September 20, 2011.   
69 David Morandi, e-mail message, September 23, 2011. 
70 Ibid. 
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Block  Title 
1 Intelligence Fundamentals 
2 Geospatial Information & Services 
3 World Issues & Strategic Perspectives 
4 Introduction to Analysis 
5 Electromagnetic Theory 
6 Air Forces 
7 Integrated Air Defense Systems 
8 Joint Forces 
9 Space/Ballistic Missiles, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Terrorism 
10 Human Resource Intelligence (HUMINT) 
11 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 
12 Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) 
13 Measurement & Signals Intelligence (MASINT) 
14 Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR) Campaign Planning 
15 Application Exercise (APEX) 
16 Targeting 
17 Operational Intelligence Functions 
18 Mission Planning 
19 Wing/Unit Employment Exercise 
20 Certification 
21 Air Operations Center (AOC) Exercise 
Table 1.   Intelligence Officer Course Syllabus71 
                                                 
71 Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Course Syllabus, Intelligence Officer Course, June 
15, 2007. 
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The depth of material covered within the course is dictated by the course training 
standard (CTS) and the school follows the standardized AF proficiency levels to manage 
syllabi and training.  These training proficiency levels are broken into three categories—
task performance, task knowledge, and subject knowledge—and each of these are 
subdivided into four values of increasing knowledge or task ability.  See Table 2—
Proficiency Key Code.  The 14N course is covered almost entirely at the first two levels 
of proficiency, mostly due to the sheer amount of material covered in a relatively short 
time period.    
Table 2.   Proficiency Key Code72 
                                                 
72 Air Education and Training Command (AETC), X30BR14N1 Course Training Standard, 
Undergraduate Intelligence Training and Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Flying Training, 
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Intelligence Formal Training, January 2009, 1. 





Can do simple parts of the task. Needs to be told or shown how 
to do most parts of the task  
2 Partially 
Proficient 
Can do most parts of the task.  Needs help only on the hardest 
parts.  
3 Competent Can do all parts of the task. Needs only a spot check of work. 
4 Highly 
Proficient 
Can do the complete task quickly and accurately. Can tell or 
show others how to do the task. 
Task 
Knowledge 
a Nomenclature Can name parts, tools and simple facts about the task. 
b Procedures Can determine step by step procedures for doing the task. 
c Operating 
Principles 
Can identify why and when the task must be done and why each 
step is needed. 
d Advanced 
Theory 
Can predict, isolate, and resolve the problems about the task. 
Subject 
Knowledge 
A Facts Can identify basic facts about the subject. 
B Principles Can identify relationship of basic facts and state general 
principles about the subject. 
C Analysis Can analyze facts and principles and draw conclusions about the 
subject. 




To its credit, the Intelligence Officer Course effectively accomplishes what it was 
designed to do—provide officers a core curriculum of basic intelligence fundamentals.  
As explained in Chapter II, the current 14N career field approach of intelligence 
generalists results in officers being trained on all aspects of Air Force intelligence.  The 
repercussions of this approach in can be viewed as both a strength and a weakness.  The 
obvious strength of this approach is the near elimination of the “stove-piped” intelligence 
officer because officers are trained, at least at an introductory level, across nearly every 
foreseeable AF intelligence application.  This allows 14Ns to “see the bigger picture” 
based on their broad training base.  The obvious weaknesses are the depth of the course 
material presented and resultant lack of knowledge and task proficiency.  Almost the 
entire curriculum is covered at the two lowest proficiency levels—task performance “1” 
and “2,” task knowledge “a” and “b,” and subject knowledge “A” and “B” (see Table 
2)—meaning that 14Ns leave the course with familiarity of a broad task and knowledge 
set, but with very little proficiency or expertise.73  For 14Ns on their way to AFSOC 
flying wings, this places the burden of specialization training (by design) on the next 
phases of intelligence training—IQT and MQT.   
B. INITIAL QUALIFICATION TRAINING (IQT) 
Initial Qualification Training (IQT) serves as the second phase of overall 14N 
training and provides AFSOC intelligence officers their first specialization training 
opportunities.  AFSOC IQT requirements are directed by AFI 14-202 Intelligence 
Training and AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1 and are fulfilled by the AFSOC Intelligence 
Formal Training Unit (IFTU) at Hurlburt Field, Florida.  Similar to the Intelligence 
Officer Course’s approach of training officers across all AF intelligence disciplines, the 
                                                 
73 While not an emphasis area for this research, recently expanded AF missions sets (e.g. cyber) are 
covered very little in the current 14N course and future significant syllabus additions could detract from the 
current curriculum by watering down an already generalized course.  This could mean even less time 
dedicated to the current topics.  Senior AF intelligence leadership will ultimately have to make a decision 
regarding 14N training—allow some level of specialization at the AFSC-awarding course, increase the time 
allocated for 14N training to allow sufficient time to train across all AF intelligence applications, or 
increase the course content and accept the consequences of additional courseware added to the syllabus.    
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AFSOC IFTU trains 14Ns across all AFSOC missions and applicable intelligence 
disciplines,74 with the exception of officers bound for RPA and DCGS squadrons as 
described previously.  AFI 14-202 mandates completion of the AFSOC IFTU prior to 
operational unit-level assignments in the Major Command’s (MAJCOM) squadrons and 
officers must attend and complete the 20-day course either enroute to, or shortly after 
reporting to their assigned flying wings.  After graduating the course, officers are 
certified as basic qualified (BQ).75   
1. Course Description 
The AFSOC IFTU is designed to familiarize intelligence personnel with AFSOC 
mission tasks and the course prepares students for assignment to AFSOC operational 
units.76  Graduates are trained to the familiar level in SOF and personnel recovery (PR) 
aircraft capabilities and limitations, SOF command and control structures, Pararescue 
Team and Combat Control capabilities and limitations, weapons employment and 
characteristics, avionics and countermeasures use, and SOF/PR specific-terminology.77  
Graduates also have a “limited proficiency in intelligence automated data-processing 
equipment and operations,” and are trained for proficiency in tailored analysis, and 
mission planning.78  
2. Syllabus 
The AFSOC IFTU course is broken into eight blocks of instruction interwoven 
into a comprehensive syllabus flow (i.e., they are not taught sequentially like the 14N 
course) and serves to familiarize students with AFSOF mission tasks.  The course builds 
                                                 
74 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-202 Volume 1, Intelligence Training, March 10, 2008, 5. 
75 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 1, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training, June 
1, 2009, 7. 
76 Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Flying Training, Air Force Special Operations 
Command (AFSOC) Intelligence Formal Training,  January 2009. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 1. 
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on concepts from the 14N course and provides focus on AFSOC-specific intelligence 
requirements.  A summary of the instructional blocks is included in Table 3.  
 
Block  Title Block Contents 
INT Intelligence Training Critical Thinking, Analytical Methods (IPOE), Imagery Support to 
AFSOC, Security, Intel Cycle Management, Intel Support to Force 
Protection, Request for Information (RFI) Processes and 
Procedures, Targeting Terrorist Networks 
BRF Briefing, Debriefing, & 
Reporting 
Mission Reports (MISREP), MISREP Practical, Contingency 
Briefings, Debriefing & Reporting 
DFS Defensive Systems Electronic Protection (EP) Systems, Defensive Countertactics, 
Infrared (IR) Countermeasures 
WPN Weapons System Intro to USSOCOM, MC-130E/H/P/W, EC-130 Commando Solo, 
AC-130H/U, STS Employment, CV-22, HH-60G, U-28, Aircraft 
Static Display, AFSOC Remotely Piloted Aircraft, 11th 
Intelligence Squadron, Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID) 
THT Threats Threat aircraft, radar surface-to-air missiles (SAM), IR SAMs, 
man-portable air defense systems, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), 
threat lasers & anti-helo mines, asymmetric threats to SOF  
PRC Personnel Recovery 
Concepts 
Personnel recovery (PR), combat search and rescue (CSAR), PR 
case study, Nat’l Agency Support to PR 
MSN Mission Planning SOF Mission Planning Exercise/Organization, Case Studies 
(Somalia/Lebanon), HUMINT case study  
SYS Systems Mission Planning Tools - FalconView, Integrated Many on Many 
(IMOM), IRC Chat Basics, Geospatial Products Listing 
Table 3.   AFSOC IFTU Syllabus Blocks79 
 
                                                 
79 Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Flying Training, Air Force Special Operations 
Command (AFSOC) Intelligence Formal Training, January 2009, 1. 
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The course is taught eight times per year, with a capacity of 12 students per 
class.80  While completing the curriculum is mandated by AFI 14-202, there is a shortage 
of training slots for current demand, resulting in a backlog of student attendees.81  The 
AFI does make provisions for this situation, and students not able to attend the course in-
residence can take a course equivalent utilizing approved training materials after 
submitting a waiver request.82   
After three weeks of instruction, students participate in a week-long special 
operations planning exercise (SOPE).  Students are placed into teams and research, 
prepare and ultimately present a final briefing.  This capstone event is utilized to 
demonstrate skills and knowledge learned in the course.83  
3. Analysis 
With a 20-training-day syllabus dedicated entirely to familiarizing 14Ns with 
AFSOC roles, missions, platforms familiarization, and intelligence for AFSOF, the 
AFSOC IFTU fulfills a critical first-line specialization training requirement.  In addition 
to providing specialized training on platforms, missions, capabilities and employment, 
the course also contains a block on critical thinking, analytical methods, and SOF-related 
case studies to help students apply the concepts taught in the course.  Ultimately, the 
course effectively accomplishes what it is designed to do—familiarize intelligence 
personnel with AFSOC mission tasks and prepare students for assignment to AFSOC 
operational units.  The course’s strengths lie in its experienced instructor cadre, its 
focused and proven AFSOC curriculum, and the capstone exercise which serves to 
reinforce the course content for students.  Unfortunately, the course is unable to reach 
beyond the first two levels of proficiency (See Table 2—Proficiency Key Code), again, 
due to the amount the material covered in the relatively short period of time.  This is also 
 
                                                 
80 Donald Severns, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 23, 2011.   
81 Ibid.   
82 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 1, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training, June 
1, 2009, 7. 
83 Donald Severns, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 23, 2011.   
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by design, and after completing IQT, AFSOC 14Ns move to the next phase of 
specialization training—Mission Qualification Training (MQT)—at their respective 
squadrons. 
C. MISSION QUALIFICATION TRAINING (MQT) 
Mission Qualification Training (MQT) is conducted at the AFSOC 14N’s 
assigned flying wing and is designed to “qualify intelligence personnel in an assigned 
duty position to perform the unit mission.”84  MQT establishes a specialization-training 
baseline for specified tasks, knowledge, and roles the 14N will be expected to execute at 
his or her squadron.  14Ns establish initial currencies in all AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR-directed 
tasks and graduate MQT in either basic mission capable (BMC) or combat mission ready 
(CMR) status.85 
1. Course Description 
MQT requirements and courseware are based on requirements established in AFI 
14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1 AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training.  This training starts 
within 45 days of the 14N’s first duty day and intelligence officers must complete MQT 
before they can proceed to their assigned flying squadrons.  Training duration ranges 
from four to eight weeks, depending on the flying wing, and is generally the 
responsibility of the Intelligence Weapons Officer (IWO) or similarly designated officer.   
2. Syllabus 
Utilizing AFI guidance, IWOs at AFSOC flying wings establish their own MQT 
syllabi.  This approach allows instructors to maximize specialization training for specific 
platforms, squadrons, and local procedures.  Local specialization also provides a small 
classroom setting (i.e., just a few students per instructor) and a great degree of flexibility 
allowing instructors the ability to tailor specialization training for specific operational and 
                                                 
84 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 1, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training, June 
1, 2009, 8. 
85 Ibid. 
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tactical needs.  AFI 14-2 directed requirements are broken into two categories—
knowledge MQT and task MQT—and are listed in Table 4. 
 
Knowledge MQT Unit Weapons System Academics 
Intelligence Integration in Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection 
Area of Responsibility (AOR) Threat 
AOR Visual Recognition 
Personnel Recovery/Recovery Operations (PR/RO) 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Integration 
Humanitarian Relief/Civil Search and Rescue (SAR) 
Research, Analysis, and Dissemination 




Initial Situation Briefing 
Situation Briefing 
Air Tasking Order (ATO) / Airspace Control Order (ACO) / Special 









Table 4.    AFI 14-2 MQT Requirements 
MQT syllabi at the 1st Special Operations Wing (1 SOW), Hurlburt Field, FL, 
353rd Special Operations Group (353 SOG), Kadena AB, Japan, and 27th Special 
Operations Wing (27 SOW), Cannon AFB, NM all meet and exceed the AFI-directed 
requirements.  Each syllabus contained a unique strength and the intelligence weapons 
officers interviewed were passionate about their training programs.  Strengths in the 1 
SOW MQT syllabus included three intelligence analysis classes aimed at teaching 
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students “how” versus “what” to think.86  The courses cover counter-terrorism analysis, 
analysis and assessments, and principles of surface-to-air fire analysis.87  A notable 
strength in the 353 SOG MQT syllabus was MC-130H and MC-130P platform academics 
taught by flying squadron aircrews in the 14N’s future squadron.88  A noteworthy 
strength in the 27 SOW MQT curriculum included four training blocks dedicated to 
analysis and critical thinking.89  All three MQT programs included multiple training 
“practicals”—individual and team application exercises—on topics such as threats, 
insurgent groups, and ISR capabilities and employment.   
3. Analysis 
In terms of specialization training, MQT provides the best learning opportunities 
for 14Ns for multiple reasons.  First, almost all concepts taught in MQT have been 
introduced at the intelligence officer course and the AFSOC IFTU, meaning that 14N 
students are not hearing the information for the first time.  Revisits on this important 
academics should mean more retention for 14Ns in MQT.  Second, the “how does this 
apply to me” question is not a factor—14Ns attend this training at their assigned 
operational AFSOC flying wing, during a time when they are about to be assigned to an 
operational AFSOC flying squadron.  Third, 14Ns are in a small classroom environment 
with a recognized subject matter expert—the intelligence weapons officer—resulting in a 
situation where tailored training and time for question and answer sessions rule.  For 
these reasons, MQT is arguably one of the most important phases of specialization 
training for AFSOC 14Ns.  Effectively executing this level of specialization results in 
maximum preparedness for 14Ns going to operational flying squadrons. 
                                                 
86 Jessica Graves, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 22, 2011.   
87 Ibid.   
88 Jonathan Baker, interview by author, Kadena AB, Japan, November 2, 2011.   
89 Adam Young, e-mail interview, November 8, 2011. 
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D. CONTINUATION TRAINING (CT) 
Continuation training (CT) provides the vehicle for AFSOC 14Ns to maintain 
AFI-directed currencies, and proficiency and knowledge on a myriad of threats, SOF 
aircraft and tactics, ISR, evasion and recovery knowledge, current intelligence updates, 
and job-related tasks.  Training is divided into two categories—internal intelligence 
training (intelligence personnel training intelligence personnel) and mission related 
training via the ready intelligence program (RIP).90  Both knowledge proficiencies and 
task proficiencies must be maintained for 14Ns to operate effectively at the unit level.   
1. Course Description 
Internal intelligence training “is intended to facilitate maintaining designated 
qualification and currency status of all intelligence personnel.”91  The intent of the ready 
intelligence program (RIP) is “to ensure intelligence personnel perform mission essential 
tasks with sufficient frequency to maintain proficiency in their duty positions.”92 CT is 
designed as an ongoing training event for intelligence personnel to maintain currencies on 
required knowledge and tasks.  In general, unit-level intelligence personnel meet weekly 
and train, as required, in accordance with AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR.  Intelligence officers 
assigned to flying squadrons maintain combat mission ready status (CMR) while 
intelligence leadership (e.g., the Special Operation Support Squadron—SOSS) generally 
maintaining basic mission capable status (BMC).  All RIP currency requirements are 
detailed in Table 4—Ready Intelligence Program Requirements. 
2. Syllabus 
CT requirements are scheduled and executed in accordance with AFI 14-2 
AFSOF/PR Volume 1.  Training is also documented in accordance with the AFI to ensure 
currencies are maintained. 
                                                 




Currency                                         
Requirement 
Frequency to Maintain 
Combat Mission Ready 
Frequency to Maintain Basic 
Mission Capable 
Manual Order of Battle Semi-Annually Annually 
Automated Order of Battle Semi-Annually Annually 
Changeover Briefing Semi-Annually Annually 
Deployment Briefing Semi-Annually Annually 
Initial Situation Briefing Semi-Annually Annually 
Situation Briefing Semi-Annually Annually 
ATO/ACO/SPINS/STSR Breakout Semi-Annually Annually 
Mission Planning Semi-Annually Annually 
Mission Folder Construction Semi-Annually Annually 
Mission Briefing/Alert Briefing Quarterly Annually 
Step Briefing Quarterly Annually 
Mission Tracking Semi-Annually Annually 
Debriefing Quarterly Annually 
Intelligence Reports Quarterly Annually 
Table 5.   Ready Intelligence Program Requirements93 
3. Analysis 
The greatest strength in CT is that intelligence personnel must meet currency 
requirements in the RIP much like pilots and aircrews meet readiness requirements in the 
ready airman program (RAP).  While CT consumes time and resources, it is a good 
investment to guarantee 14N readiness.  This approach to training is a new development 
for Air Force Intelligence and began in mid-2005 with F-16 and KC-135 flying wings.  
AFSOC began this transformation in 2008 and 2009.  Success in this approach to training 
lies in the ability, or inability, to maintain currencies.  In the event of excessive additional 
                                                 
93 AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training, June 1, 2009, 15. 
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duties added to a 14Ns responsibilities, a historical problem area for unit-level 
intelligence officers, RIP currency requirement scheduling should take priority and trump 
other tasks.  Unfortunately, another possible result is little reduction in the 14N’s 
workload, leaving officers no option but to work long days to keep up with their 
responsibilities.      
E. ADDITIONAL SPECIALIZATION TRAINING 
External intelligence training (EIT)—the formal name for intelligence personnel 
training aircrews—requires a final phase of specialization training for 14Ns.  EIT 
requirements are completed after MQT and must be accomplished before 14Ns train 
AFSOC aircrews unsupervised.  As per AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1, “all intelligence 
personnel assigned or attached to a special operations squadron must be qualified as 
EITs.”94 In addition to completing MQT, and qualification in either BMC or CMR status, 
14Ns must complete Code of Conduct Training (CoCT) Level B before teaching 
personnel recovery (PR) topics.95  The complete list of EIT specialization training is 
included in Table 6 and training event currencies are included in Table 7. 
 
Event Topic 
EIT 1 External Intelligence Training Concepts and Methods 
EIT 2 AOR Threat 
EIT 3 Collection and Reporting 
EIT 4 Visual Recognition 
EIT 5 Personnel Recovery (PR) 
EIT 6 Intelligence Integration in Force Protection 
Table 6.         External Intelligence Trainer (EIT) Event Matrix 
                                                 
94 AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training, June 1, 2009, 17. 
95 Ibid., 15. 
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Event Specialized Training Currency Requirement 
AOR Threat Complete EIT 1 and EIT 2 
and specific tasks 
Initial EIT Evaluation 
Quarterly 
Instruct 1 threat training event per                            
3 month period 
Collection and 
Reporting 
(C & R) 
Complete EIT 1 and EIT 3 
and specific tasks 
Initial EIT Evaluation 
Annually 
Instruct 1 C&R training event per                         




Complete EIT 1 and EIT 4 
and specific tasks 
Initial EIT Evaluation 
Semi-annually 
Instruct 1 VR training event per                              
6 month period 
Personnel 
Recovery (PR) 
Complete EIT 1 and EIT 4 
and specific tasks 
Initial EIT Evaluation 
Annually 
Instruct 1 PR training event per                             





Complete EIT 1 and EIT 6 
and specific tasks 
Initial EIT Evaluation 
Annually 
Instruct one FP training event per                       
12-month period 
Table 7.   External Intelligence Trainer Event Training Currencies.96 
F. SUMMARY 
After being selected to the intelligence career field, AF officers bound for AFSOC 
squadrons begin a five-phase training process which can last up to one year.  After 
completing the AFSC-awarding Intelligence Officer Course, AFSOC 14Ns proceed to the 
AFSOC IFTU, which serves as IQT, at Hurlburt Field, FL.  Next, MQT provides a 
tailored training baseline for their individual assignment.  Specialized Training ensures 
they are prepared to instruct intelligence to SOF aircrews, and lastly, continuation 
training (CT) ensures they maintain all AFI-directed currencies.  These five phases of 
rigorous training are required to ensure 14Ns can perform their duties and responsibilities 
                                                 
96 AFI 14-2 AFSOF/PR Volume 1, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Training, June 1, 2009, 19. 
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at operational AFSOC squadrons and serve to prepare for their roles and responsibilities 
in operational AFSOC flying squadrons. 
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IV. SQUADRON LEVEL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) intelligence officers assigned 
to manned flying units such as AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and “Non-Standard Aviation” 
(Light Airlift) squadrons serve as critical members of the squadron operations team and 
are essential to squadron-level operations effectiveness.  While specific, nuanced tasks 
within each squadron are slightly different based on the supported aircraft mission design 
series (MDS), intelligence officer roles and responsibilities at the unit-level include, in 
general, providing updates on current theater events, threat disposition and capabilities, 
mission planning operations, and evasion and recovery support. 97  Accurate, mission-
tailored intelligence contributes to mission accomplishment, whereas inaccurate and non-
mission-tailored intelligence could lead either to degraded mission accomplishment, or, 
in a worst-case scenario, damage or destruction of the platform, crew, and failure of the 
special operations mission in its entirety.   
After briefly discussing intelligence training and the basic differences between in-
garrison and deployed operations, this chapter will explain Air Force Instruction (AFI) 
intelligence requirements for flying units and explore, in detail, each of the intelligence 
roles and responsibilities that enable AFSOC missions during employment and 
sustainment.  These intelligence operations roles and responsibilities include information 
flow, order of battle displays, mission planning, briefing, debriefing, reporting, and 
personnel recovery support.  The chapter will conclude with a brief summary, an 
explanation of the knowledge requirements essential to effective unit level intelligence 
operations, and a question—is the level of knowledge required for effective unit-level 
intelligence provided to AFSOC intelligence officers by the time they are assigned as 
“mission-ready” to their respective squadrons? 
                                                 
97  Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, 
June 1, 2009, 14-17. 
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B. OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS 
Broadly speaking, AFSOC unit-level intelligence roles and responsibilities can be 
broken into two main situations or environments—(A) in garrison or “peacetime” 
operations and (B) deployed or contingency operations.  While intelligence roles and 
responsibilities are somewhat similar in both environments, the obvious aim of unit-level 
intelligence during peacetime/in-garrison operations is to train and prepare squadron 
leadership, planners, and aircrews for their combat roles during deployed / contingency 
operations.  Once deployed or directly in support of an operation or contingency, 
intelligence primary roles and responsibilities revolve around employment and 
sustainment of the mission.   
C. UNIT LEVEL INTELLIGENCE REPONSIBILITIES 
1. Overview 
Air Force flying unit responsibilities (service-wide and not specific to AFSOC) 
are delineated within AFI 14-202 Volume 3 General Intelligence Rules.  Within this 
instruction, eight key functions for unit level intelligence are mandated: 98   
1. Research, analysis, and dissemination of all incoming information and 
intelligence to all applicable mission personnel (e.g. battle staffs, aircrews, 
mission planners, subordinate units, etc.)  
 
2. Maintaining current order of battle displays 
 
3. Providing updated automated threat files for use in automated mission 
planning systems 
 
4. Establishing quality control procedures for reports (mission reports and 
intelligence reports) and monitoring the flying schedule and unit taskings 
to anticipate reporting requirements 
 
5. Ensuring units access to the most current intelligence available and 
immediate dissemination of theater threat update codes 
 
                                                 
98 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-202 Volume 3, General Intelligence Rules, March 10, 2008, 17-18. 
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6. Providing intelligence support to commanders and their staffs through 
current and relevant intelligence products and briefings 
 
7. Providing intelligence to base organizations, base agencies, tenant 
organizations and transient units as needed 
 
8. Managing all production requests (PR) and requests for information (RFI) 
2. Guidance 
The AFSOC Director of Intelligence (A2) provides a supplement to AFI 14-202 
Volume 3 General Intelligence Rules which mandates additional tasks for intelligence 
units in the command.  This document is the Air Force Special Operations Command 
Supplement to General Intelligence Rules, dated 10 March 2008.  While there are 
numerous additional tasks added to the instruction, no additional tasks are specifically 
added to the flying unit responsibilities already delineated above.99 
Unit-level intelligence roles and responsibilities specific to AFSOC squadrons are 
delineated within AFI 14-2 (AFSOF/PR) Air Force Special Operations Forces/Personnel 
Recovery) Volume 3 AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures.100  Within this 
instruction, roles and responsibilities for the “employment and sustainment of AFSOF 
units101” are mandated through seven key tasks—information flow, order of battle 
displays, mission planning, briefing, debriefing, reporting, and personnel recovery 
support.102  The challenge for unit-level intelligence officers is to manage and execute 
these key tasks effectively with the intelligence personnel—rarely more than two 
personnel at any given time—and resources available.  
                                                 
99 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-202 Volume 3,  Air Force Special Operations Command  
Supplement to General Intelligence Rules, March 8, 2010. 
100 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, 
June 1, 2009. 
101 Ibid., 14. 
102 Ibid. 
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3. Research, Analysis and Dissemination 
The overarching task for AFSOC unit-level intelligence is to facilitate information 
flow.  Communication of “significant and critical intelligence”103 must be timely, 
accurate, and consistent.  Communication including questions, events, issues, incoming 
intelligence, systems status, as well as any other key information/intelligence as the 
situation dictates must be coordinated amongst all squadron personnel.  Formal 
communications with higher headquarters such as mission reports, intelligence reports, 
and requests for information (RFIs) must also be managed in accordance with local and 
command procedures.104  Ultimately, intelligence officers will succeed or fail based on 
their ability to disseminate information and intelligence efficiently and effectively, 
throughout the entire squadron and mission.  One of the primary means which unit level 
intelligence officers communicate the intelligence situation is through order of battle 
displays. 
4. Order of Battle Displays 
Order of battle displays provide battlespace situational awareness to flying 
squadron leadership, aircrews, mission planners, and intelligence personnel and are 
crucial to effective special operations missions.105  Displays generally take one of two 
forms—either digitally using geographic information system (GIS) software (e.g., Falcon 
View or Google Earth), or hard-copy charts and maps displayed on a table or wall and 
updated manually.  Regardless of the medium, the display is a representation of the battle 
space area of operations (AO) on a geospatially-appropriate base map and includes 
operations information as well as intelligence.106  Friendly force and operations 
information includes mission and operational objectives, friendly force orders of battle 
(air, land, sea, conventional and SOF), personnel recovery information, and local 
                                                 
103 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, 
June 1, 2009, 16. 
104 Ibid., 16. 
105 Ibid., 14-15. 
106 Ibid., 14-15. 
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conditions information.  Intelligence displayed on the map includes enemy activities, 
conventional enemy orders of battle (air, land, and sea forces, known positions, etc.), 
irregular enemy orders of battle (terrorist and insurgent safe houses, attack locations, etc.) 
and any other applicable intelligence, including signals intelligence (SIGINT), human 
intelligence (HUMINT), and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).  The order of battle 
display serves as the squadron’s primary situational-awareness (SA) enhancing product 
and enables squadron operations.107  In addition to enabling general battle space SA, one 
of the primary uses for the display is mission planning. 
5. Mission Planning 
Detailed and meticulous mission planning is essential for effective flying 
missions, and intelligence personnel play a key role in mission success at the squadron 
level.  After receiving the mission from the air tasking order (ATO) or other tasking 
document, information from the airspace control order (ACO) and special instructions 
(SPINS) are applied, and squadron operations and intelligence personnel work to plan 
mission routes, profiles, and select the appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures 
(TTPs).  Squadron intelligence personnel conduct intelligence preparation of the 
operational environment (IPOE) analysis and also consider mission, enemy, terrain, 
troops, time available (METT-T) analysis as well as observation and fields of fire, cover 
and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach (OCOKA) analytical 
approaches during mission planning.108  Analysis from IPOE, METT-T, and OCOKA 
methodologies enable intelligence personnel to make estimates on enemy detection of the 
mission, enemy response times, and aids in the selection of minimum risk mission 
routing.  Intelligence on the target or objective area is obtained and along with 
intelligence on enemy orders of battle and enemy activities, intelligence personnel make 
recommendations on ingress routing, objective area threat mitigation, and egress 
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routing.109  Ultimately, mission products are created for use during the briefing and 
execution of the mission.  Products include geospatial representations with overlaid 
information and intelligence for the route, target/objective area, and any other locations 
where the mission might fly.  Often times, less detailed products (i.e., smaller-scale 
maps) on the entire AO are included to aid aircrews in the event of a mission divert or 
dynamic re-tasking.110  Mission plans are modified, as required, up to the point of 
execution based on new threats, new environmental conditions, modified taskings, and 
diverted missions.111 
6. Briefing, Debriefing, and Reporting 
Briefings are among one of the primary methods for the dissemination of 
information and intelligence at the squadron level.  Briefings are provided to all levels 
within the squadron including leadership, planners, flyers, and intelligence personnel.112  
Intelligence briefings provide situational awareness throughout almost all squadron 
wartime functions including situation updates to decision makers, situation updates for 
mission planning, mission briefings, and shift changeover briefings.   
Debriefings are also essential to squadron intelligence effectiveness, and theater 
as well as Air Force instructions mandate an intelligence debriefing of operators upon  
completion of every tasked mission.113  Unit level intelligence debriefers utilize mission 
products, maps, and imagery, if applicable, for the event and the event’s focus is on 
information which could have potential intelligence value.  The fulfillment of essential 
elements of information, first covered in the mission briefing, are covered again in the 
debriefing to determine if the operators have any significant information of value post-
mission.  Time sensitive or critical information is disseminated rapidly and information 
                                                 
109 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, 
June 1, 2009, 15.. 
110 Ibid., 16. 
111 Ibid., 16. 
112 Ibid., 16. 
113 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-2AFSOF/PR Volume 3, AFSOF/PR Unit Intelligence Procedures, 
June 1, 2009, 16. 
 47 
and intelligence from the debriefing are drafted into the appropriate format and reported 
up the chain of command.114 
The two primary reports created by AFSOC unit level intelligence personnel are 
the mission report (MISREP) and the intelligence report (INTREP).115  MISREPs are the 
primary vehicle for capturing and communicating the details and narratives of all 
squadron flying missions.  Specific details of the mission such as takeoff and landing 
times, actual time on target/objective, responses and reactions to threats, sightings, and 
overall mission results are documented in the MISREP for local record and the final 
document is forwarded to higher headquarters.116  The INTREP is utilized for follow-on 
reports to MISREPs and for all other squadron level reporting of information of potential 
intelligence value. 
7. Access to Intelligence and Requests for Information (RFI) 
Throughout all unit-level intelligence responsibilities, 14Ns must ensure there is a 
process in place for aircrews, leadership, and fellow intelligence personnel to access 
intelligence.  Examples include access to threat files for mission planning purposes, 
posting intelligence update briefings for personnel to reference, and the availability of 
geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) products.  Additionally, if unit level intelligence  
 
requires information or intelligence for an operation (e.g., current imagery for a landing 
zone) which is not readily available, a process to request, track, receive, and disseminate  
RFIs must be in place.  
8. Personnel Recovery Support 
In addition to their obvious intelligence roles covered to this point, 14Ns also play 
an integral part in squadron-level personnel recovery support.  Intelligence officers 
provide threat, terrain, and cultural-level analysis to assist aircrews in developing evasion 
                                                 
114 Ibid., 17. 
115 Ibid., 17.   
116 Ibid., 17. 
 48 
plans of action (EPA).117  Additionally, intelligence personnel manage the isolated 
personnel report (ISOPREP) program.  In the event of a downed aircraft resulting in 
evading survivors, these crucial documents provide combat search and rescue forces the 
ability to authenticate downed and evading aircrews.  Unit level intelligence officers must 
also understand evasion, resistance, and recovery principles to include pre-mission 
sanitization procedures, bailout and evasion procedures, the code of conduct, prisoner of 
war rules of engagement, and personnel recovery procedures in order to integrate these 
details effectively into the mission and briefings.118 
D. SUMMARY 
Air Force Instructions detail each of the intelligence roles and responsibilities that 
enable AFSOC missions during employment and sustainment—information flow, order 
of battle displays, mission planning, briefing, debriefing, reporting, and personnel 
recovery support.  But if the training is not adequate and the knowledge and skills of 
intelligence officers are lacking even slightly, the effectiveness of AFSOC 14Ns can be 
quickly degraded.  At this point, an important question must be asked: Do the 14Ns 
assigned to AFSOC flying squadrons have the knowledge and skills required to 
effectively fulfill the “employment and sustainment” tasks outlined in the AFI?  Is their 
knowledge of threat systems, the area of operations (AO), AFSOC platforms, SOF teams 
and missions, personnel recovery principles and intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) sufficient to provide the required content? 
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V. SURVEYS AND INTERVIEWS 
This research was designed to shed light on an important issue—AFSOC 14N 
performance at AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NSAV flying squadrons—and aimed to 
answer an important question:  Does the specialization training provided to AFSOC 14Ns 
sufficiently prepare officers for their duties at the unit level?  To answer this question, a 
two-pronged approach was utilized.  First, extensive research and interviews were 
conducted on training provided to AFSOC 14Ns to baseline current syllabi, curriculums, 
and methods, with an emphasis on specialization training.  Second, an anonymous web-
based survey was developed and executed to gauge 14N performance at the unit level.  
The survey was e-mailed to squadron leadership (commanders, operations officers, and 
weapons officers) as well as 14Ns serving at operational AFSOC flying squadrons.  
A. TRAINING RESEARCH 
Research on the five phases of 14N training—Intelligence Officer Course, IQT, 
MQT, specialized training, and CT—was conducted to gauge the current state of 14N 
training and to collect detailed information on current training initiatives and syllabi.  Site 
visits, interviews, and discussions were conducted with officers at the 315th Training 
Squadron (Intelligence Officer Course), the AFSOC IFTU (IQT), and the 1st Special 
Operations Support Squadron (1 SOSS).  The 1 SOSS is responsible for MQT, 
specialized training, and CT for all 14Ns assigned to the 1st Special Operations Wing (1 
SOW).  Interviews were conducted with select instructors at the Air Force Special 
Operations School (AFSOS) to explore potential specialization training resources already 
in existence.  Telephone and/or e-mail interviews were conducted with intelligence 
officer leadership at the 27th Special Operations Wing (27 SOW) Cannon Air Force Base, 
New Mexico and 353 Special Operations Group (353 SOG), Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, 
Japan, to research the state of specialization training at these organizations. 
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B. SURVEYS 
In order to gauge AFSOC 14N performance at the unit-level, anonymous web-
based surveys were developed and distributed to squadron leadership and key personnel 
at AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NSAV squadrons.  Recipients of the survey included 
key consumers of unit-level intelligence, namely squadron commanders, operations 
officers, and weapons officers.  The surveys asked a series of questions regarding 
intelligence officer knowledge, skills, performance, and the need for additional 
specialization training based on performance.  Survey categories and questions were 
based on 14N requirements as mandated by AFI (reference Chapter IV—14N Roles and 
Responsibilities) and are detailed below.  Intelligence officers at these squadrons received 
similar surveys and were asked to rate their own performance. 
1. Knowledge and Skills 
Squadron leadership and key personnel were asked to assess the knowledge and 
skills of 14Ns assigned to their squadrons, based on performance, for a series of 
statements on a scale from one to five—strongly disagree through strongly agree.  
Intelligence officers were also asked to rate their own knowledge and skills.  This portion 
of the survey explored knowledge and skills based on performance for the following 
statements: 
 a. 14Ns understand adversary threat equipment (anti-aircraft artillery, 
 surface to air missiles, heavy machine guns, etc) capabilities and 
 limitations 
 b. 14Ns understand adversary threat tactics 
 c. 14Ns understand adversary personnel disposition (networks/leadership) 
 d. 14Ns understand primary mission aircraft capabilities and limitations 
 e. 14Ns understand primary mission aircraft tactics 
 f. 14Ns understand Special Operations Command (SOCOM) organizations 
 g. 14Ns understand SOCOM teams 
 h. 14Ns understand SOCOM missions 
 i. 14Ns understand available ISR resources 
 51 
 j.  14Ns understand how to obtain available human intelligence (HUMINT) 
 resources 
 k. 14Ns understand how to obtain available geospatial intelligence 
 (GEOINT) resources 
 l. 14Ns understand how to obtain available signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
 resources 
 m. 14Ns understand survival, evasion, resistance, escape (SERE) principles 
 n. 14Ns possess the necessary critical thinking skills 
 o. 14Ns possess the necessary analytical skills 
 p. 14Ns are responsible for additional duties which significantly detracts 
 from their intelligence duties 
 q. 14Ns serve as a critical member of this squadron/team 
 r. 14Ns provide relevant, mission-tailored products 
 
With statistical analysis, trends and patterns in survey responses were analyzed to 
determine areas of strength, areas of weakness and potential areas for improvement.  
Other factors were analyzed as well including the links between how highly 14Ns were 
viewed as a part of the team and their overall effectiveness ratings, the link between 
excessive additional duties and overall effectiveness, and the links between analytical 
skills/critical thinking and overall effectiveness, among others.  Similarities and 
differences from the two perspectives (squadron leadership and 14Ns) were also analyzed 
to determine similarities and discontinuities from the surveys.  14N training was 
compared to weakness areas to determine whether officers had received training on these 
topics.  In these cases, emphasis was placed on the extent and type of training 14Ns 
received for causation analysis.  Full results of the survey analysis are provided in 
Chapter VI—Survey Results. 
2. Tailored Intelligence 
Undertrained, or even untrained individuals, can technically “provide 
intelligence” to leadership, mission planners, and aircrews, however, the lack of adequate 
training should be obvious based on the quality of the intelligence provided.  Specifically, 
the extent to which the intelligence is tailored for the audience is a primary factor for 
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determining effectiveness.  Well-trained intelligence professionals tailor intelligence and 
products based on the airframe, the mission, and environment, among other factors.  The 
next survey question sought to explore the extent to which 14Ns were tailoring their 
intelligence products for AFSOC squadron leadership, mission-planners and aircrews.  
Squadron leadership and intelligence officers were asked to rate how effectively 14Ns 
tailored intelligence products on a scale from one to five, with one representing very 
generic (worst) products and five representing highly mission tailored (best) products.  
The survey included the following categories: 
 a. Current intelligence products 
 b. Threat briefings/products 
 c. Targeting/target package/terminal area products 
 d. Mission planning products 
 e. Providing available HUMINT 
 f. Providing available GEOINT 
 g. Providing available SIGINT 
 h. SERE/Evasion and recovery products 
 
Results from this portion of the survey were utilized to determine how effectively 
14Ns were tailoring intelligence for their squadrons.  Areas of strength and weakness 
were analyzed to determine links between knowledge and the ability to effectively tailor 
intelligence.  Where applicable, areas of weakness were compared to training syllabi to 
determine possible factors of causation.  Lastly, 14N responses were compared to 
leadership responses to determine trends and incongruence.   
3. Specialization Training Recommendations 
The next survey question sought to explore the opinions of AFSOC squadron 
leadership and 14Ns on the need for additional specialization training.  Squadron 
leadership and key personnel were asked to assess the knowledge and skills of 14Ns 
assigned to their squadrons on a scale from one to five—strongly disagree through 
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strongly agree.  Intelligence officers were also asked to rate their own knowledge and 
skills.  This survey question explored the following categories: 
 a. 14Ns require no additional training to contribute to this mission 
 understand adversary threat equipment (anti-aircraft artillery, surface to 
 air missiles, heavy machine guns, etc) capabilities and limitations 
 b. 14Ns require additional training on adversary threat capabilities, 
 limitations and tactics 
 c. 14Ns require additional training on mission aircraft capabilities, 
 limitations, and tactics 
 d. 14Ns require additional training on SOCOM organizations, teams and 
 missions 
 e. 14NS require additional training on ISR platform capabilities 
 f. 14Ns require additional training on GEOINT 
 g. 14Ns require additional training on HUMINT 
 h. 14Ns require additional training on SIGINT 
 i. 14Ns require additional SERE training 
 j. 14Ns require additional analysis training 
 k 14N s require additional critical thinking skills training 
 
Results from this portion of the survey were utilized to determine most and least 
common recommended areas for additional training to determine potential emphasis 
areas for specialization training.  Analysis was also accomplished to determine links 
between weak performance and recommended additional training.  14N responses were 
again compared to leadership responses to determine trends and incongruence.  
4. Open-Ended Survey Questions  
Opportunities to provide comments were available after each section of questions 
and several specific open-ended questions were included in the leadership surveys to 
provide the opportunity for squadron leadership to state opinions, thoughts, and provide 
feedback outside the construct of a regimented survey.  Squadron leadership were asked 
the following two questions: 
 a. Are there any products, in your opinion, that 14Ns are not providing? 
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 b. In your opinion, are there any knowledge gaps or missing skill sets which 
 AFSOC Intelligence officers do not currently possess? 
 
Results from the open ended questions were analyzed to determine trends in 
AFSOC leadership views on 14N performance.  Responses were also utilized to provide 
alternative perspectives on expectations and observations of AFSOC intelligence officers.  




VI. SURVEY RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The survey utilized in this research was purpose-built in order to assess AFSOC 
unit-level 14N effectiveness at the unit level for AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NSAV 
squadrons.  The survey targeted two main groups of individuals in AFSOC flying units—
leadership and flying squadron intelligence officers.  Leadership, for the purposes of this 
survey, was defined as squadron commanders (CC), operations officers (DO or Ops-O), 
weapons officers (W-prefix), and intelligence flight commanders (SOSS/IN).  In total, 28 
leadership surveys were returned as a part of this study.  The second category for the 
surveys were 14Ns serving at the squadrons listed above.  Unfortunately, not all AFSOC 
squadrons have assigned 14Ns—non-commissioned officers fulfill the unit level 
intelligence roles—thus limiting the potential number of surveys.  In total, eight surveys 
were evaluated as a part of this study.  Analysis was accomplished across the three main 
categories in the survey—14N knowledge and skill, 14N product tailoring, and 
recommendations for additional specialization training—from both the leadership and 
intelligence officer perspectives.  Analysis included comparison of responses between the 
two groups in the survey, correlation analysis, and regression analysis.       
B. ANALYSIS 
1. Statistical Analysis 
a. 14N Knowledge and Skills 
In the first section of the survey, respondents were asked to rank 
statements regarding 14N knowledge and skills.  There were main eight categories of 
questions (See Table 8) leading up to the final statement:  “14Ns provide relevant, 
mission-tailored intelligence products.”  Respondents were asked to rate each statement 
on a five-point scale—one through five—with one representing strong disagreement with  
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Category Variable Mean                    
(Standard Deviation) 





Equipment 4.091 (0.610) 4.500 (0.534) 0.409 
Tactics 3.773 (0.752) 4.750 (0.463) 0.997 
Personnel 3.857 (0.853) 4.375 (0.517) 0.518 
Blue  
Forces 
Mission Aircraft 3.909 (0.971) 4.625 (0.744) 0.716 
Mission Aircraft Tactics 3.500 (1.058) 4.750 (0.463) 1.250 
 
SOCOM 
Organizations 3.227 (0.972) 4.000 (1.195) 0.773 
Teams 3.000 (1.183) 4.625 (0.517) 1.625 
Missions 3.182 (1.220) 4.625 (0.517) 1.443 
 
ISR 
Resources 3.864 (0.941) 4.375 (0.744) 0.511 
HUMINT 3.091 (1.306) 3.500 (1.309) 0.409 
GEOINT 3.864 (1.246) 4.625 (0.517) 0.761 
SIGINT 3.182 (1.140) 4.000 (1.309) 0.818 




Critical Thinking Skills 3.809 (1.030) 5.000 (0) 1.191 
Analytical Skills 3.900 (0.852) 5.000 (0) 1.100 
Detractors Excessive Additional Duties 3.136 (1.356) 3.750 (1.035) 0.614 
Team 14N Critical Team Member 4.227 (0.812) 3.375 (1.408) -0.852 
Overall Effective Intelligence 3.909 (1.019) 4.625 (0.517) 0.716 
Table 8.   Survey Results—14N Knowledge and Performance  
statement and five representing strong agreement with the statement.  A statistical 
analysis of the 14N knowledge and performance variables (See Table 8) reveals that, 
overall, according to AFSOC leadership, 14Ns generally have adequate knowledge and 
skills to perform effectively in unit level intelligence positions.  Similarly, with slightly 
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higher average overall responses, 14Ns agreed they have the knowledge and skills 
required for effectiveness at unit-level intelligence positions.  From the leadership’s 
perspective, 14Ns possess the knowledge and skills required for success in unit level 
operations as evidenced by the 3.909 mean (SD 1.019) for the overall dependent 
variable—effective intelligence.  In comparison the 14N survey yielded a 4.625 mean 
(SD 0.517) for the dependent variable.  However, more nuanced variations and insightful 
difference can be drawn from the data.   
For instance, AFSOC leadership rated 14Ns the highest in the threat 
category, portions of the blue forces category, portions of the ISR category, the analysis 
and critical thinking category, and the team category.  The two strongest categories were 
threat equipment knowledge and 14Ns as a critical team member.  The weakest 14N 
areas identified by leadership in the survey were SOCOM knowledge and portions of ISR 
knowledge.  Intelligence officers rated themselves high—above 4.0—in all categories 
except HUMINT, and being a critical member of the team.   
In terms of threat equipment, leadership agreed that 14Ns possessed the 
necessary knowledge with the second highest mean in this section of the survey—
4.091—and the lowest standard deviation (0.610) measured in this portion of the survey.  
One leadership survey participant summed up this general observation with the statement 
“In the legacy platforms (AC-130) TOD (threat of the day) briefs are effective because 
they are tailored to known mission profiles.”119  This survey participant then went on to 
explain some of the low marks as well—“Newer AFSOC aircraft (NSAV) are less 
tailored which could be a hit on ops because we are not doing a good enough job of 
getting the intel folks in the airplane for fam rides.”120 Knowledge of enemy tactics and 
personnel disposition were slightly lower with a 3.773 mean  (SD 0.752) and  3.857 mean 
(0.853), respectively.  14Ns were also confident in their threat knowledge, with 4.500, 
4.750, and 4.375 means, respectively, in the threat equipment, tactics, and personnel 
categories.  One survey participant summed up 14N threat knowledge with the following 
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statement: “Overall—AFSOC intelligence officers understand threats and have obviously 
been well trained in their primary duty.”121   
Interestingly, 14Ns were as confident in their threat knowledge as their 
blue forces knowledge.  14N survey means for mission aircraft and tactics knowledge 
were 4.625 and 4.750, respectively.  Leadership agreed with 14N mission aircraft 
knowledge as adequate, and rated this category as high as 14N threat knowledge.  
However, this was not always the case.  One leadership survey participant requested 
intelligence officers possessed “more familiarity with their supported aircraft.”122 
One of the leadership survey’s weakest areas for observed 14N knowledge 
and skills was the SOCOM category.  The three SOCOM variables included in the 
survey—organizations, teams and missions—yielded means of 3.227 (SD 0.972), 3.000 
(SD 1.183), and 3.182 (SD 1.220), respectively, from the leadership’s perspective.  14Ns 
rated their SOCOM knowledge significantly higher, and placed their knowledge nearly 
equal to their threat knowledge.  From the 14N perspective, SOCOM organizations, 
teams and missions yielded means of 4.000, 4.625, and 4.625 respectively.  While 14Ns 
need not be experts on the SOCOM organizations, teams and missions, it is essential that 
they are familiar enough to allow accurate analysis and the appropriate context while 
providing intelligence for aircrews, mission planners and leadership.  The data reveals 
that 14Ns are confident they possess this knowledge, while leadership observed weaker 
SOCOM knowledge.  One leadership survey participant summarized the need for more 
training on the subject—“our whole force could use more education on SOCOM 
structure, missions, and goals.”123  The implication is that 14Ns may be overconfident in 
their knowledge of SOCOM organizations, teams and missions, and increased knowledge 
could result in improved intelligence analysis and products due to an enhanced 
understanding of these forces, their capabilities, and methods. 
                                                 




AFSOC leadership identified 14Ns having adequate knowledge in ISR 
resources (mean 3.864, SD 0.941) and GEOINT (mean 3.864, SD 1.246), but 
comparatively weaker knowledge in HUMINT and SIGINT with means of 3.091 (SD 
1.306) and 3.182 (SD 1.140), respectively.  14Ns agreed that they possessed the required 
knowledge for effectiveness in ISR resources (mean 4.375, SD 0.744), GEOINT (mean 
4.625, SD 0.517) and , in contrast to the leadership’s observations, 14Ns were confident 
in their SIGINT knowledge (mean 4.000, SD 1.309).  14Ns were in agreement with the 
leadership’s perspective on HUMINT, with this rated as the weakest knowledge in the 
ISR category (mean 3.500, SD of 1.309).   
In the critical thinking and analytical skills category, AFSOC leadership 
identified 14Ns as having adequate knowledge and skills with a mean of 3.809 (SD 
1.030) and 3.900 (SD 0.852), respectively.  Leadership ratings in this category were 
among the highest ratings in this portion of the survey and were equivalent with 
leadership’s view on 14N threat knowledge.  Intelligence officers were highly confident 
in their critical thinking and analytic skill abilities.  The mean was 5.000 for both 
categories (SD 0).    
The intent of the “excessive additional duties” question was to determine 
if 14Ns were excessively over-tasked with non-intelligence related tasks.  The piling-on 
of additional duties is an unfortunate, but common problem among unit level intelligence 
officers—14Ns are often the only non-rated officers in the squadron.  Ideally, the mean 
response to this question would be close to “1”; however, the mean response from 14Ns 
was 3.750, which indicates a substantial agreement to the statement.  The standard 
deviation on this question was 1.035.  Put simply, this means additional duties could 
potentially impose a heavy burden on the 14N’s primary intelligence duties.  While a few 
additional duties might not detract from 14N performance, excessive additional duties 
can significantly detract from their job performance.  The mean leadership response to 
this question was 3.136 with a standard deviation of 1.356.  In summary, some leadership 
seem to underestimate the impact of distracters on the 14N’s performance. 
The “14N is a critical member of the team” question was designed to 
determine what to extent AFSOC 14Ns were integrated into the squadrons, from two 
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perspectives.  Interestingly, this category was the lowest mean (3.375) from the 14N 
perspective, but the highest mean from the leadership perspective (4.227).  Translated, 
this means that leadership are confident their 14Ns are critical member of the team—with 
comparatively little variance (SD 0.887)—while some 14Ns did not feel they were a part 
of the team—with double the variance (SD 1.408).  14N responses ran the entire 
spectrum from strongly disagree (1)  through strongly agree (5), meaning that some 14Ns 
felt strongly about being a critical team member while others felt the opposite.  
Connectedness to the team is obviously not a given, and like any professional 
relationship, it takes effort from both sides.  One leadership survey participant stated “it 
all comes down to willingness to truly be a part of the squadron.  Intel members are 
caught between their functional community and the squadrons they support.”124  While 
this is true, sometimes AFSOC aircrews must identify opportunities, reciprocate, and help 
to develop their 14Ns as integral members of the team.  In almost every case, the 14N 
will be one of the only “non-fliers” in the squadron.  With tasks that often take the 14N 
out of the immediate reach of the aircrews, it is crucial that both sides work to make the 
operations-intelligence relationship a strong one.  
b. 14N Product Tailoring 
The next data set analyzed were the responses from both leadership and 
14Ns on the extent to which 14Ns tailored their products for aircrews, mission planers 
and leadership.  There were eight questions included in this section of the survey 
(reference Table 9) and respondents were asked to rate to what extent 14Ns tailored their 
products to the audience and mission.  Respondents were asked to rate each statement on 
a five-point scale—one through five—with one representing “very generic products” 
(worst) and five representing ‘highly mission-tailored products’ (best). 
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Table 9.   Survey Results–14N Product Tailoring 
In terms of product tailoring, leadership observed, overall, that seven of 
eight categories met the neutral (3) value and fell between “neutral” and “somewhat 
mission tailored” (4).  Leadership observed that 14Ns tailored current intelligence better 
than any other category in this section of the survey (mean 4.045, SD 0.722).  This was 
the only category from the leadership’s perspective which met the “somewhat mission-
tailored” threshold.  All other categories fell in between the values of three and four.’   
14Ns observed, overall, that seven of eight categories met the “somewhat 
mission tailored” and fell between “somewhat mission tailored” (4) and “highly mission-
tailored” (5).  The survey revealed that 14Ns felt their best-tailored products were 
SIGINT (mean 4.667, SD 0.516), and target package/terminal area products (mean 4.571, 
SD 0.534).  Leadership observations did not agree with these 14N-identified strength 
areas.  According to the leadership survey, SIGINT and target package/terminal area 
products were two of the lowest categories with means of 3.278 and 3.631, respectively.   
14N Product Tailoring Leadership                 
Response 




Variable Mean                        
(Standard Deviation) 
Mean                 
(Standard Deviation) 
Delta 
Current Intelligence  4.045 (0.722) 4.250 (0.707) 0.205 
Threat 3.682 (0.893) 4.125 (1.126) 0.443 
Target Package/Terminal Area 3.631 (1.116) 4.571 (0.534) 0.940  
Mission Planning Products 3.818 (1.097) 4.286 (1.113) 0.468 
HUMINT 3.187 (1.109) 4.000 (1.095) 0.813 
GEOINT 3.611 (1.145) 4.333 (1.211) 0.722 
SIGINT 3.278 (1.127) 4.667 (0.516) 1.389 
SERE 3.714 (1.007) 3.750 (1.488) 0.036 
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c. 14N Specialization Training Recommendations 
In the third section of the survey, respondents were asked to rank 
statements regarding additional 14N specialization training.  There were 11 main 
categories of questions (See Table 10) that generally correlated with the questions 
regarding 14N knowledge and skills.  Similar to the 14N knowledge and skills questions, 
respondents were asked to rate each statement on a five-point scale—one through five—
with one representing strong disagreement with statement and five representing strong 
agreement with the statement regarding 14Ns requiring additional specialization training.  
See Table 10—Specialization Training Recommendations.  
A statistical analysis of the 14N Additional Training Recommendations 
data reveals, overall, that both 14Ns and AFSOC leadership felt that 14Ns require some 
form of additional specialization training.  On the statement “14Ns require zero 
additional specialization training,” leadership disagreed more than 14Ns.  The mean 
leadership response was 1.864 (SD 0.774) while the mean 14N response was 2.625 (SD 
1.408).  The most recommended training from the leadership perspective was on the 
topics of SOCOM, mission aircraft, HUMINT and SIGINT.  From the 14N perspective, 
the most recommended training topics were SOCOM, SERE, mission aircraft, threat, and 
HUMINT.   
The commonalities in this recommendation—SOCOM, mission aircraft, 
and HUMINT—make sense as these were highlighted as areas for improvement in the 
14N knowledge and skills survey.  Additionally, as described in Chapter III—14N 
Training, courses on SOCOM and HUMINT were included, but were not lengthy nor a 
major focus area.  Leadership’s recommendation for SIGINT training agrees with their 
observation of this particular “INT” as somewhat weak and makes sense due to the 
limited amount of SIGINT training now provided in the intelligence officer course.  The 
14N request for additional training on SERE topics also makes sense as none of the 14Ns 
surveyed had attended SV-80 USAF Survival Training, while all aircrews must attend 
this training prior to assignments to operational flying wings.  The 14N request for 
additional threat training, despite strong marks from leadership and self-assessment in the 
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14N knowledge and skills survey, probably indicates that 14Ns are humble regarding 
their constant need for more knowledge on a recognized primary intelligence 
responsibility.  Some 14Ns are thriving in this arena, however, despite the lack of formal 
survival training.  One leadership survey noted “the intel corps does a very good job 
producing SERE products and making sure the ISOPREPS have been accomplished.”125 
Table 10.   Survey Results–14N Training Recommendations 
2. Correlation Analysis 
To determine areas of importance based on individual intelligence variables and 
the overall dependent variable—14Ns provide relevant, mission tailored intelligence—a 
correlation analysis was accomplished and analyzed.  See Table 11.   
                                                 
125 Anonymous Survey Respondent, October 2011. 
Training Recommendations Leadership             
Response 




Variable Mean                  
(Standard Deviation) 
Mean                     
(Standard Deviation) 
Delta 
No Additional Training Req’d  1.864 (0.774)  2.625 (1.408) 0.761 
Threat 3.454 (1.101) 3.750 (0.707) 0.296 
Mission Aircraft 3.773 (0.922) 3.875 (0.640) 0.102 
SOCOM 4.091 (0.921) 4.000 (0.756) -0.091 
ISR Platforms 3.524 (1.209) 3.375 (1.188) -0.149 
GEOINT  3.571 (1.248) 3.50 (1.309) -0.071 
HUMINT 3.714 (1.055) 3.750 (1.281) 0.036 
SIGINT 3.667 (1.016) 3.125 (1.458) -0.542 
SERE 3.364 (1.093) 3.875 (0.641 0.511 
Analysis Skills 3.364 (1.293) 3.250 (1.035) -0.114 
Critical Thinking Skills 3.428 (1.325) 3.250 (1.035) -0.178 
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Correlation Analysis–Individual Variables 
versus the Dependent Variable (Effective 
Intelligence) 
Leadership   
Result 




Category Variable Value Value Delta 
 
Threat 
Equipment 0.477 0.258  -0.218 
Tactics 0.594 0.745 0.152 
Personnel -0.186 0.067 0.253 
Blue  
Forces 
Mission Aircraft 0.321 0.696 0.374 
Mission Aircraft Tactics 0.490 0.745 0.256 
 
SOCOM 
Organizations -0.019 0.693 0.711 
Teams 0.184 0.467 0.283 
Missions 0.064 1.000 0.935 
 
ISR 
Resources 0.192 0.046 -0.146 
HUMINT 0.202 -0.105 -0.307 
GEOINT 0.414 0.467 0.052 
SIGINT 0.333 0.211 -0.122 




Critical Thinking Skills 0.632 - - 
Analytical Skills 0.680 - - 
Detractors Excessive Additional Duties 0.062 -0.467 -0.528 
Team 14N Critical Team Member 0.497 0.221 -0.277 
Table 11.   Correlation Analysis–Individual Variables Versus Dependent Variable 
From the leadership’s perspective, correlation analysis on the individual 
intelligence variables against the dependant variable reveals that leadership values the 
following areas of 14N knowledge and skill the most:  Threat, blue forces, GEOINT, 
SERE, analysis and critical thinking, and 14Ns as a critical team member.  The least 
valued knowledge and skill areas were SOCOM knowledge and detractors (excessive 
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14N additional duties).  Interestingly, in the ISR category, knowledge in overall ISR 
resources, HUMINT, and SIGINT did not correlate as strongly as GEOINT and threat.  
This probably results from the generally held view that 14Ns primarily provide threat 
products and GEOINT products (Imagery, IMINT, maps and charts) for AFSOC flying 
squadrons. 
From the 14N perspective, the correlation analysis reveals strong ties to the 
dependent variable in the following categories:  Threat tactics, blue forces, SOCOM and 
GEOINT.  The weakest ties to the overall dependent variable—effective intelligence—
were ISR resources, HUMINT, SIGINT, and SERE. It is very interesting that 14Ns 
placed a higher value on blue forces and SOCOM knowledge as compared to key ISR 
variables such as HUMINT and SIGINT.  This probably reveals that the AFSOC 14Ns 
surveyed are more comfortable with blue forces and SOCOM knowledge than with 
HUMINT and SIGINT—most likely due to the fact that they work with the former 
categories daily, and do not necessarily work with HUMINT or SIGINT on a regular 
basis.  
The results from the detractor question—designed to determine how leadership 
and 14Ns viewed excessive additional duties—were also very interesting.  Based on the 
correlation analysis, leadership were overall neutral on this variable’s impact on 14N 
effectiveness.  That is, the correlation value was not a significant positive number or a 
significant negative number.  From the 14N perspective, the value was a significant 
value, approximately on par with the importance of GEOINT, but a negative value.  This 
means that 14Ns recognize that excessive detractors impact their performance 
effectiveness, while leadership did not recognize this as an issue. 
3. Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis on the knowledge and skill variables was conducted to 
determine areas of importance as seen by the leadership.  For the purposes of this 
analysis, the categories of variables were analyzed (threat knowledge, blue forces 
knowledge, etc) versus the individual variables as seen in previous tables.  Unfortunately, 
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due to the low number of 14N surveys returned, regression analysis from the 14N 
perspective was not possible.  See Table 12—Regression Analysis. 
 
Category Coefficient t 
Threat 1.142 1.450 
Blue Forces 0.278 0.760 
SOCOM -0.960 -2.680 
ISR 0.024 0.060 
Analysis & Thinking 1.123 2.230 
Detractors 0.096 0.530 
Number of Observations:  19                                                                  R Squared: 0.734 
Table 12.   Regression Analysis 
The results from the regression analysis reveal that leadership value threat 
knowledge and analysis and critical thinking skills more than any other AFSOC 14N 
knowledge or skill analyzed.  This correlates with previous analyses, although more 
detailed results on individual variables is available in previous sections of this chapter.  
Interestingly, SOCOM knowledge and ISR were not weighted nearly as heavily as threat 
and the ability to think and analyze. 
C. SUMMARY 
Statistical and correlation analysis of the survey results revealed many useful and 
interesting conclusions regarding AFSOC 14N unit level performance.  Survey results 
from both the 14N’s perspective and the leadership’s perspective allowed some basic 
“compare and contrast” analysis and shed light on AFSOC 14N performance.  Overall, 
14Ns are getting the job done at the unit level, as evidenced by the leadership’s marks on 
14Nperformance in terms of knowledge, skills, and intelligence product tailoring.  This 
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does not mean, however, that all is completely well.  Valuable lessons can be learned and 
improvements can be made to existing processes in the constant struggle to make unit-
level intelligence better. 
Statistical analysis of the 14N knowledge and performance variables revealed that 
AFSOC leadership felt 14Ns generally have adequate knowledge and skills to perform 
effectively in unit level intelligence positions.  Similarly, and with slightly higher average 
overall responses, 14Ns also agreed.  In terms of product tailoring, leadership observed, 
overall, that seven of eight survey categories met or exceeded the neutral value (3) for 
product tailoring, while 14Ns observed that seven of eight categories of their own 
products met the “somewhat mission tailored” category (4) and fell between “somewhat 
mission tailored (4) and “highly mission-tailored” (5).  This reveals that 14Ns view their 
products as more highly mission-tailored as compared to the leadership’s observations on 
the same products.    
The leadership’s most recommended training for 14Ns was on SOCOM, mission 
aircraft, HUMINT and SIGINT and from the 14N perspective, the most recommended 
additional training topics were SOCOM, SERE, mission aircraft, threat, and HUMINT.  
The commonalities in this recommendation—SOCOM, mission aircraft, and HUMINT—
make sense as these were highlighted as areas for improvement in the 14N knowledge 
and skills survey.   
The “14N is a critical member of the team” question was the lowest mean value 
from the 14N perspective, but the highest mean from the leadership perspective.  
Translated, this means that leadership are confident their 14Ns are critical member of the 
team, while some 14Ns did not feel they were a part of the team.  As discussed above, 
operations-intelligence integration is critical to effective flying operations.  This starts 
with a sound professional relationship between 14Ns and their squadron’s aircrews.   
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This project is designed to shed light on an important issue—AFSOC 14N 
performance at AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, and NSAV flying squadrons.  In order to 
answer the research question—does the specialization training provided to AFSOC 14Ns 
sufficiently prepare officers for their duties at the unit level—a two-pronged research 
approach was utilized.  Research and interviews conducted on AFSOC 14N 
specialization training revealed that extensive specialization training is provided to 
intelligence officers bound for AFSOC flying squadrons.  This training takes place in 
three major phases—initial qualification training, mission qualification training, and 
specialized training—and must be completed before assignment to an operational 
squadron.  The majority of specialization training takes place at the operational flying 
wing, providing a tremendous opportunity to tailor training to a specific 14N’s needs.  
Unfortunately, because of the operational tempo at AFSOC flying wings, this training is 
not always uninterrupted or without distractions.   
The anonymous, purpose-built, web-based survey was developed and executed to 
gauge 14N performance at the unit level.  The survey was e-mailed to squadron 
leadership (commanders, operations officers, and weapons officers) as well as 14Ns 
serving at operational AFSOC flying squadrons and revealed that, overall, AFSOC 14Ns 
are getting the job done at the unit level.  While 14Ns assessed their own performance 
slightly higher than their leaders’ observations, the mean responses from leadership 
revealed no major grievances or shortcomings approaching failure.  There were, however, 
some weaknesses revealed which can be fixed to improve 14N performance. 
The following pages build on the findings and analysis of the previous six 
chapters and propose recommendations to improve AFSOC 14N performance at the unit 
level.  The recommendations fall into four major categories—wing level emphasis on 
specialization training, coordination to maximize current training efforts, specialization 
training recommendations, and a specialization career path. 
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A. PRIORITIZING SPECIALIZATION TRAINING 
1. Recommendation 
AFSOC wing senior intelligence officers (SIOs) place the highest possible 
priority on specialization training and provide maximum manning, resources and 
uninterrupted time blocks for MQT, specialized training, and continuation training.   
2. Discussion 
Unlike the intelligence officer course and the AFSOC intelligence IFTU that 
occur in a dedicated training environment, specialization training at the wing takes place 
in an operational setting where competing priorities are the norm.  As a result, reduced 
manning in training shops, interruptions, and shortened training cycles are sometimes 
chosen to meet operational requirements.  Conducting specialization training at an 
operational wing has its benefits, too, which certainly outweigh the drawbacks.  Access to 
the operational squadrons, the weapons platforms, and the actual working spaces, among 
others, are critical to specialization training success.  As discussed in Chapter III—MQT, 
specialized training, and continuation training are the most critical phases of 
specialization training and placing a priority on these critical phases of training will pay 
dividends in the long run, primarily with more highly trained 14Ns.  One reaps what one 
sews. 
3. Conclusion:  Prioritizing Specialization Training 
The power to place maximum prioritization on specialization training lies with the 
AFSOC Wing SIO / Special Operations Support Squadron Intelligence Flight 
Commanders (SOSS/IN).  Wherever and whenever possible, SIOs need to ensure their 
training shops are manned to the maximum feasible levels, scheduling allows 
uninterrupted training time, and decisions to interrupt training are made only when 




in the future with more highly trained 14Ns.  If resources and manning are unavailable, 
requests to higher headquarters would be more than justified based on the AFI mandates 
for conducting specialization training.   
B. MAXIMIZING CURRENT EFFORTS THROUGH COORDINATION 
While travelling and conducting interviews during this thesis research, it became 
obvious that almost every institution visited could benefit from training or products from 
another organization.  With little effort besides taking the time to schedule and coordinate 
these efforts, there were three standout instances where already existing products and 
processes could benefit another individual or organization tremendously. 
1. Recommendation 
a. Intelligence Weapons Officers Coordinate and Share 
Specialization Training Products 
b. AF Special Operations School (AFSOS) Instructors Coordinate 
with AFSOC IFTU Instructors to Schedule AFSOC IFTU 
Training 
c. 14Ns Leverage AFSOS Expertise for Specialized Products 
2. Discussion 
Due to the fact that wing-level specialization training is developed based on each 
individual wing’s requirements, separate training programs were created for each of the 
three AFSOC wings included in this research.  In analyzing these training programs, it 
quickly became obvious that other AFSOC wings could benefit from some of the training 
programs included in MQT, specialized training, and continuation training programs.  
Similarly, while interviewing Major Christopher Mullins, the Course Director for the US 
Central Command Theater for SOF (CTSOF) at the USAF Special Operations School 
(USAFSOS), it was mentioned that 14Ns and other instructors within the USAFSOS 
could greatly benefit from some the academics taught at the AFSOC IFTU—especially 
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training on AFSOC platforms and missions.126  These academics were identified as 
courses that could enhance analysis and background on AFSOC capabilities for AFSOS 
instructors.  Lastly, during this same interview, Major Mullins mentioned an 
underutilized intelligence resource at the USAFSOS—requests for tailored training 
products from operational flying squadrons.  In a representative example of this 
capability, a special operations squadron (SOS) requested a specific country briefing, 
tailored to future deployment location, be researched and briefed at the squadron.  14Ns 
at unit level assignments (SOS and SOSS) must be aware that they need not operate in a 
vacuum.  Learning to leverage existing expertise and capitalizing on the capabilities of 
outside organizations maximizes time for other critical squadron tasks.  
3. Conclusion 
Coordination, delegation, and leveraging the capabilities and expertise of other 
AFSOC organizations is crucial for any successful intelligence application.  With 
minimal time required, the three examples listed above are representative of maximizing 
resources and working as efficiently as possible.  AFSOC 14Ns at all levels should look 
to leverage existing resources and expertise whenever possible and especially in a time of 
heavy budget restraints.   
C. SPECIALIZATION TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Recommendation 
AFSOC 36-2201 requires the Introduction to Special Operations Course for all 
personnel assigned to AFSOC within six months of assignment to the command.  
a. Discussion 
Based on the leadership survey results, AFSOC 14N knowledge of 
SOCOM organizations, teams, and missions was comparatively weak.  While leadership 
did not necessarily correlate SOCOM knowledge to the overall dependent variable, unit-
                                                 
126 Christopher Mullins, telephone interview by author, September 27, 2011.   
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level 14Ns must have a working SOCOM to facilitate analysis and products and context.  
The Introduction to Special Operations Course (ISOC) is a three-day, operational level 
introduction to SOCOM components, history and heritage, and SOF core areas.127  The 
course is designed for AFSOC personnel E-1 through O-6 and accommodates 
approximately 1200 students per year.128  Discussion on making this course a mandatory 
requirement for all personnel assigned to the command through AFSOC 36-2201 was 
ongoing at the time of this research.   
b. Conclusion 
While ISOC most likely wouldn’t remedy every potential weakness for 
AFSOC 14Ns, the training would be highly beneficial to further familiarize unit-level 
intelligence officers with AFSOC and SOCOM.  The case studies would also benefit 
14Ns and could add additional historical context to their analytical tool kits.  It is 
recommended that AFSOC 36-2201 be passed with the ISOC provision.        
2. Recommendation 
Academics on Non-Standard Aviation (NSAV) platforms be added to the AFSOC 
IFTU curriculum.  
a. Discussion 
During the research for this project, the syllabi and requirements for all 
required AFSOC specialization training were obtained and reviewed in detail.  While 
analyzing the AFSOC IFTU syllabus, it was noted that academics on all AFSOC 
platforms (AC-130, MC-130, CV-22, MQ-1/9, etc.) were included with one exception—
non-standard aviation academics.  NSAV platforms are a relatively new addition to 
AFSOC, and this helps to explain the deficiency.  14Ns with assignments to NSAV 
squadrons do receive platform academics during MQT, however, adding dedicated 
platform academics during IQT to serve to further enhance this training.    
                                                 
127 Ned Calvert, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 23, 2011.   
128 Ned Calvert, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 23, 2011.   
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b. Conclusion 
Adding NSAV platform academics to the AFSOC IFTU curriculum would 
benefit all AFSOC 14Ns, especially those bound for NSAV squadrons.   
3. Recommendation 
Intelligence Weapons Officers add HUMINT training and practical exercises to 
mission qualification training and continuation training curriculums.  
a. Discussion 
Survey analysis revealed a weakness in 14Ns knowledge on leveraging 
human resources intelligence.  HUMINT, when available, can provide critical insights 
and intelligence which are not available via other means.  Unfortunately, HUMINT is a 
complicated source for intelligence, and 14Ns must learn techniques on how to utilize 
this resource effectively.  During research interviews at 1 SOSS/IN, Hurlburt Field, FL, 
Captain Jessica Graves revealed a highly effective HUMINT academic course and 
practical that is included in the 1 SOW MQT program.  It is recommended that Capt 
Graves share this courseware with intelligence weapons officers at other AFSOC bases to 
help train AFSOC 14Ns to retrieve, analyze and utilize this critical resource.   
b. Conclusion 
14N weaknesses in HUMINT resources are completely understandable.  
Unit-level intelligence officers rarely work with this resource and, as a result, are likely 
not comfortable utilizing this sometimes complicated source of intelligence.  Academics 
on how to retrieve and analyze HUMINT, in addition to practical exercises, will go far to 
help increase unit level 14N effectiveness with this resource.  
4. Recommendation 
AFSOC 14Ns solidify their mission aircraft knowledge through familiarization 
flights, simulator missions, aircraft tours, and “tactical talk” discussions  
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a. Discussion 
Survey results from both the leadership and 14N perspectives revealed that 
14Ns had adequate knowledge on mission aircraft and tactics.  Despite this observation, 
and despite the academics provided on AFSOC platforms at the intelligence officer 
course, the AFSOC IFTU, and mission qualification training, both leadership and 
AFSOC 14Ns recommended additional specialization training on mission aircraft and 
tactics.  This is understandable, since tailoring intelligence to the AFSOC mission is 
impossible without understanding the platform and its tactics.  Academics can only do so 
much for knowledge, as evidence by this situation.  Application and experience will get 
the most mileage in this situation, and unit level 14Ns are encouraged to maximize their 
opportunities on familiarization flights, simulators, and aircraft tours/walk-arounds with 
an emphasis on engaging with a knowledgeable aircrew member.  14Ns should engage in 
detailed, tactical discussion regarding the platform, tactics, techniques and procedures, 
and intelligence applications for the mission and crew. 
b. Conclusion 
Academic knowledge alone can only take an student so far, and applying 
this knowledge coupled with familiarization flights, simulator missions, aircraft walk-
arounds, and detailed tactical discussions with a knowledgeable crew member will help 
to solidify 14N knowledge of the platform and tactics.  These activities will also help to 
build stronger bonds with aircrew members and build trust, camaraderie, and teamwork.  
D. SPECIALIZATION CAREER PATH  
1. Recommendation 
Senior USAF intelligence leadership allows a portion of the 14N force to 
specialize within AFSOC/SOCOM 
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2. Discussion 
The AF approach to managing 14N careers since 1999 has brought unnecessary 
challenges to the force.  Not allowing some degree of specialization has resulted in 14Ns 
who are over generalized and undertrained due to the vast skills sets and knowledge 
required for effectiveness.  Initially, this left the burden on 14Ns themselves, however, in 
recent years modifications to specialization training regulations and programs has helped 
tremendously.  Specialization training does not replace experience, however, and the 
continued practice of bouncing 14Ns between commands, missions, and even domains 
(air, space, cyberspace) throughout their careers is unnecessary and detracts from 
intelligence expertise.  Allowing specialization within a set of capabilities and missions—
such as AFSOC and SOCOM—would allow a level of depth, experience, and expertise 
without necessarily sacrificing a career or excessively “stove-piping” officers. 
In the case of an AFSOC/SOCOM specialization, a 14N could have sufficient 
experience and leadership opportunities, while still showing career progress in terms of 
ever-increasing levels of responsibility and spheres of influence.  With assignments 
available in unit level operations (AC-130, MC-130, Special Tactics), SOF ISR (MQ-1, 
MQ-9, DCGS), the AFSOC Staff (A2), overseas opportunities (EUCOM, PACOM), and 
Field Grade Officer and above assignments at combatant commands (CENTCOM, 
SOCOM), the Pentagon (Air Staff, Joint Staff) and joint assignments with SOCOM, 
14Ns could proceed through an entire career and maintain a level of credibility and 
expertise on AFSOC/SOCOM organizations, teams, and missions.  This approach could 
still prepare 14Ns for eventual assignments in to Joint Intelligence Positions (J2), if the 
individual’s career progressed to that point.  This approach would not necessarily be 
exclusive to AFSOC/SOCOM, and could also be applied to the Space and Cyber 
domains, as well as other appropriate tracks.  Broadening would still be utilized with 
professional military education (PME) as well as the ISR 300 and ISR 400 curriculums 
proposed with the new approach 14N career management.  14Ns could also still be 
centrally managed, so that in the event of a shortfall, intelligence officers could be moved 
into positions where needed. 
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3. Conclusion 
Air Force senior leadership should look into redefining what level of 
specialization is allowable for 14Ns.  While the approach introduced here is not 
necessarily advocating that 14Ns be permanently assigned to AFSOC/SOCOM track, an 
increased degree of specialization would build expertise, and not necessarily sacrifice the 
experience needed for 14N effectiveness.  As evidenced in the RAND study on 14N 
utilization, the current approach broadens officers to an excessive extent, and is 
counterproductive to intelligence expertise.   
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APPENDIX A:  14N SURVEY (LEADERSHIP VERSION) 
 
 
Figure 2.   14N Survey (Leadership Version) Page 1 
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Figure 4.   14N Survey (Leadership Version) Page 3 
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APPENDIX B:  14N SURVEY (14N VERSION) 
 


































Figure 14.   Command Sponsor Letter 
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Figure 15.   Interview Questions and Themes 
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